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Following the fall of Siad Barre’s government in 1991, Somalia entered a period of political vacuum and experienced one of the longest-lasting instances of state fragmentation in modern history. Research on failed and collapsed states has generally focused on the causes and effects of the armed conflicts of the 1990s, which occurred in the post-Cold War era, examining the driving factors and dynamics behind these conflicts (Rotberg, 2003; Zartman, 1995; World Bank, 2005). As Rotberg (2003) notes, “despite being a nation-state with a shared language, religion, and history of nationalism,” Somalia began to collapse in the late 1980s and soon collapsed entirely. Similarly, Zartman (1995) defines failed states as “situations in which the state’s basic functions can no longer be performed” and cites Somalia as the most significant example of this phenomenon.
The collapse of state authority in Somalia has led to a serious security vacuum. The Al-Shabaab movement, established in 2006, rapidly seized control of Somalia’s central and southern regions and has become one of the largest and most powerful terrorist organizations affiliated with Al-Qaeda in Africa (Hansen, 2013; Menkhaus, 2014). Although they were forced to withdraw from Mogadishu, their continued ability to maintain a presence and retain the capacity to conduct attacks across the country’s vast rural areas serves as compelling evidence of the shortcomings of international security assistance models in understanding Somalia’s unique security dynamics (Rossiter & Cannon, 2019).
International efforts to address the security vacuum in Somalia have quickly evolved into a multi-stakeholder framework with overlapping components. The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM, 2007–2022), the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS, 2022–2024), and the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), which began in 2025, have made significant contributions to the restructuring of the Somali National Forces (SNF). Other key elements of this multi-stakeholder environment include the U.S. Advisory Program, the EU Training Mission (EUTM), and training initiatives led by the UAE. However, the steps taken by the international community toward security sector reform have often achieved only limited success due to issues such as a lack of coordination, insufficient sustainable financing mechanisms, and the complex nature of local political dynamics (ICG, 2022; UNDP, 2024). In this context, Türkiye has emerged as the stakeholder with the most distinctive intervention model.
Türkiye’s relations with Somalia began with the historic visit to Mogadishu by then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in August 2011, marking the first time in nearly 20 years that a leader from outside the West had visited Somalia (Rossiter & Cannon, 2019; Özkan & Orakcı, 2015). As Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud noted in 2016, “Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s 2011 visit to Somalia was a turning point in the country’s progress toward security and stability; I am not exaggerating” (Stearns & Sucuoğlu, 2017, p. 1). Launched in 2011 in response to the catastrophic famine in the region, this humanitarian aid program was carried out through direct aid and emergency support packages provided by organizations such as the Turkish Red Crescent, TIKA, and IHH. This strategy led Somalia to view Türkiye not merely as a “savior” but as a “partner” (Wheeler, 2011; Akpınar, 2013). According to the International Crisis Group (ICG, 2012), Türkiye successfully positioned itself during that period as a foreign actor that was “not feared, but emulated.”
Initially, Türkiye’s activities in Somalia focused primarily on providing humanitarian aid and infrastructure development; however, following the establishment of the TÜRKSOM (Türkiye-Somalia Joint Task Force) military training base in 2017, it has assumed a significant role in the security sector. Spanning approximately 400 hectares, TÜRKSOM is Türkiye’s largest military base abroad and serves as a central hub for training the Somali National Army and enhancing its institutional capacity (Rossiter & Cannon, 2019; USIP, 2020). According to Demirtaş and Pirinççi (2024), “TÜRKSOM is helping to enhance Somalia’s security capacity and plays a vital role in the training of the Somali National Army; thus, Türkiye is positioning itself as a security provider and development partner in the region.” It is projected that between 2024 and 2026, TÜRKSOM will have trained over 20,000 Somali soldiers who will form the backbone of elite units such as the Gorgor (Eagle) Commando Brigades (Hiraal Institute, 2022; TRT Africa, 2025). As of June 2023, nine Gorgor Commando Brigades have completed their training at both the TÜRKSOM facility and the commando training center in Isparta (Trends Research & Advisory, 2024).
However, TÜRKSOM’s capacity-building mission is closely linked to the structural issues affecting Somalia’s security sector. Significant obstacles hindering the effectiveness of international training programs include clan loyalties, divisions within the armed forces, irregular salary payments, the presence of ghost soldiers, and political interference (ICG, 2023; Williams & Elmi, 2023). Furthermore, Türkiye’s security partnerships have brought with them the threat of attacks by al-Shabaab targeting Turkish personnel and facilities (Caasimada Online, 2025). The Defense and Maritime Cooperation Framework Agreement, signed in February 2024 and valid for 10 years, demonstrates that this partnership has made significant progress (Al Jazeera, 2024; Trends Research & Advisory, 2024). In recent years, Türkiye has further expanded its military presence in Somalia—particularly through the deployment of F-16 fighter jets in 2026 and agreements regarding maritime zones—thereby increasing Ankara’s strategic engagement in the region (Aurora Israel, 2026; Defense Mirror, 2026).
A review of the existing literature on security sector reform (SSR) shows that most studies evaluating international organizations’ participation in state-building have focused on Western donor countries and UN initiatives (OECD-DAC, 2005; UN Security Council, 2008). In contrast, Türkiye’s engagement in the security sector through TÜRKSOM fills a significant gap in the literature. This engagement offers a unique framework that integrates Islamic solidarity, humanitarian diplomacy, and the development of military capabilities. This distinctive framework distinguishes Türkiye’s engagement from traditional peacekeeping operations and typical Western governance and security reform methodologies (Akpınar, 2021; Bilgiç & Nascimento, 2014).
This analytical study examines Türkiye’s role in the development of Somalia’s security sector by treating TÜRKSOM as a case study and focusing on the period between 2011 and 2024. The study focuses on the following central question: To what extent, and through which methods, did Türkiye support the development of Somalia’s security sector via TÜRKSOM during the 2011–2024 period, and how does this strategy compare with other security assistance models in terms of legitimacy, effectiveness, and sustainability?
Within this framework, the research will assess the core components of Türkiye’s security cooperation strategy, TÜRKSOM’s concrete contributions to enhancing the capabilities of the Somali National Army, the relationship between these efforts and regional security dynamics, and the obstacles faced by current practices. The study employs a qualitative case study methodology and conducts a comprehensive review of reports by international organizations, academic literature, official documents, and current news articles.
State-Building and Security Sector Reform
This section addresses the three conceptual dimensions that underpin this study: state-building and post-conflict stability theory, security sector reform (SSR) theory, and the relationship between security and humanitarian diplomacy in Türkiye’s foreign policy. This framework clarifies the position of the TÜRKSOM model within both state-building and SSR literature, while examining Türkiye’s hybrid approach within a comparative context alongside other global models.
a. State-Building and Post-Conflict Stability
State-building is a complex process that involves reestablishing legitimacy, capacity, and essential public services (such as security, the rule of law, and other services) in societies emerging from conflict. In the literature, the term “failed state” describes a state that cannot fulfill the basic functions defined by Weber. Rotberg (2004, p. 9) elaborates on this situation as “the state’s inability to provide its citizens with basic political goods,” citing Somalia as the prime example: “Despite being a nation-state with a shared language, religion, and nationalist heritage, Somalia failed in the late 1980s and subsequently collapsed” (Rotberg, 2004, p. 11). Zartman (1995, p. 5) defines collapse as “a situation in which the state can no longer be defined as a state” and emphasizes that recovery is possible only through local ownership.
State-building during the post-conflict stabilization phase has been reshaped in light of criticisms directed at the “liberal peacebuilding” model. Paris (2004) emphasizes the importance of strengthening institutional capacity rather than focusing on rapid liberalization. In Somalia, this effort is affected by instability stemming from clan-based systems. Effective state-building requires simultaneously strengthening security and legitimacy. Menkhaus (2003; 2007) notes that the concept of “governance without government” in Somalia demonstrates how local clan mechanisms (the xeer system) maintain order in the absence of a formal state and highlights that competition among clans has hindered the establishment of a central authority. In this context, state-building goes beyond merely developing institutional capacity; it also requires adherence to the principles of inclusivity, gradual progress, and internal ownership (OECD, 2011).
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