No Events
Donald Trump was not prepared to win the 2016 elections. At the beginning of his administration, he had to rely on figures in his party and former generals, but they were not as willing to compromise on norms as he was. Towards the end of his term, however, he began to make his views clearer. He said he believed that NATO was unfairly burdening the United States in terms of defense costs and even considered withdrawing the United States from the alliance.
In the 2024 elections, the victory of Trump and the Republicans is not a big surprise, but it does not remove uncertainty for European security. Today’s world is far more dangerous and unpredictable than in 2016, when Trump first took office. In 2016, Trump’s European interlocutors were relatively moderate politicians like Angela Merkel in Germany, Emmanuel Macron in France, Mark Rutte in the Netherlands and Giuseppe Conte in Italy. Today, far-right and populist leaders, some of them pro-Russian, are influencing politics in countries such as Germany, France, the Netherlands and Hungary.
Trump’s intentions and the implications for Europe
As Trump’s return to power shakes transatlantic relations, European countries and defense companies are preparing for a new era in defense spending. Europe will pay its way, but it will also stand on its own two feet.
The threat of NATO withdrawal could be used as a psychological impetus not only to share defense costs but also to force European partners to submit to Trump’s new defense architecture strategy through a radical reorientation of the Alliance. This could lead European leaders to conclude that building a nuclear deterrent independent of the United States, alongside an increase in conventional power, is the only meaningful way to maintain peace and security on the continent. In the UK, with its modest nuclear arsenal and reliance on NATO’s deterrence mission, Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s special relationship with Washington and his ambition to redesign London’s role on the continent may be seen as effective at this stage, but they cannot replace Washington alone. For European strategic autonomy, the entire continent needs to demonstrate its intention to improve its nuclear deterrent.
Another prerequisite for strategic autonomy is the autonomy of the European defense market. In contrast, we saw during the previous Trump administration that he forced Europeans to buy more American defense equipment.
Following Trump’s victory, Donald Tusk, former President of the European Council and current Prime Minister of Poland, emphasized Europe’s capacity to insulate itself from the fluctuations in American politics, a sentiment that has long been echoed by French President Emmanuel Macron.
European societies are also calling on their leaders to shoulder a greater share of the continent’s security burden. A recent poll reveals that 73% of Germans believe that Germany should increase spending on European security.[1] This could change defense funding priorities and have an impact on shaping Europe’s military alliances in the future.
Preparing for a new era for European defense
For several years, European leaders have been exchanging views on protecting European security against Trump. This has led to deep discussions about Europe’s strategic autonomy, but there has not been enough action to implement it, as policymakers lack the time, ambition and funding needed.
The European Union, which is supposed to be an important platform for continental security, does not yet speak with one voice, and member states are far from having the same goals on defense. Moreover, there is still competition rather than harmonized defense industrial capacity, and narrow tactical cooperation rather than joint strategy development.
Moreover, EU decision-making is slow and complex, requiring lengthy negotiations, coordination and harmonization. As Trump is potentially capable of making sharp and swift moves, his moves could outpace the EU’s ability to reform, which could create vulnerabilities.
In addition to conventional capacity, some European policymakers advocate for a “European nuclear deterrent” that could replace the American nuclear umbrella against Russian nuclear strike rhetoric. The idea of “Europeanization” of nuclear deterrence, which was put forward after Macron’s proposals, is not only unrealistic given the French doctrine, but is also argued to be contrary to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Germany will have to wait for processes like the Ukraine war to see the impact of the new Trump administration on European security. The collapse of the German governing coalition the day after Donald Trump’s election will paralyze Berlin for months. German Finance Minister Christian Lindner left the tripartite coalition over a disagreement on defense spending. As Germany enters the process of forming a new government and possible elections, it is important to note that Chancellor Olaf Sholz’s policy of investing more in defense has been adopted by the major parties.
With significant economic challenges and waning public support for continued support for Ukraine across Europe, building support for increased defense spending, not only in Germany but across the continent, will not be easy. Nevertheless, the European defense sector has begun to take shape in anticipation of increased spending. The stock values of major defense industry companies in Italy and Germany have risen by close to 20% since Trump’s election.( The stock of the Italian defense industry company Leonardo SpA has risen by 17% since Trump’s election. The stock of German arms manufacturer Rheinmetall AG rose 22%, while the stock of German defense sensors specialist Hensoldt AG rose 18%). [2]
Strategy for the transformation of defense in Europe
For the European transformation to be meaningful and successful, the European transformation to increase Europe’s defense capacity without the United States requires progress on three key issues: securing financing for a European defense breakthrough, strengthening Europe’s borders, and building long-term strategic deterrence in the east.
A change of vision and practice in European defense industrial production is envisaged, but the numbers and steps (€1.5 billion commitment to the European Defense Industrial Program and cooperation over the next decade, a set of benchmarks for intra-European defense procurement) are too small and vague to be meaningful yet. While the Warsaw-Paris axis is bolder on this issue, Berlin still fears that the spending will increase the institutional burden in the EU. In fact, Germany blocked EU funding for Poland’s Eastern Shield project to reinforce the Kaliningrad border.
At this point, non-EU actors are likely to be influential on border reinforcement. The UK is an easy and effective partner, especially given its separate defense agreements with Germany and France. Tactical, logistical and maneuvering capacity and actions to make Europe resilient to attack are increasing.
As for strategic deterrence, there is a strong belief that the alliance needs to strengthen its unity of ideas and purpose. To this end, there is a growing rhetoric of discontinuing relations with governments that do not share a Eurocentric defense vision and imposing political consequences that go beyond the withdrawal of funds.
It is quite possible that some European states, especially frontline states that feel close to the potential Russian threat, may try to buy Trump’s support through bilateral arms deals, despite their dislike of his position on Russia. Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, which already have the highest defense spending rates, are expected to be on good terms with Trump, but new arms deals would only be an additional insurance premium. But states rushing to conclude bilateral deals with the US risk a similarly uncoordinated race for American arms deals as in Trump’s first term. This would undermine much-needed European defense industrial cooperation efforts.
Without a united Europe making bold choices together, fragmentation is likely to happen again, with some preferring to prioritize their bilateral relations with Washington. European disunity will breed repetition, repetition will breed dependency, and dependency will breed deficiency.
Can the US leave NATO?
Last year, the US Congress passed a resolution making it impossible for a US president to unilaterally withdraw the country from NATO. Nevertheless, there is talk in Washington about the possibility of Trump taking this decision without Congressional approval. The question is, will Trump want to withdraw from NATO?
While a US withdrawal seems unlikely, a weakening of the US commitment to NATO would lead to a shift in global security, weaken the ‘West’ as a geopolitical concept and potentially push the EU and European states to restructure the continent’s security, with unpredictable consequences.
The fear of a weakened West succumbing to the demands of Beijing and Moscow is the most compelling factor for the US administration. Because it would mean a systemic policy failure that goes far beyond the failure of US policy in Afghanistan once the Trump administration takes office. There is a lot at stake right now, and Ukraine, NATO and the international system are all intertwined.
He would prefer to stay in NATO in order to influence its policies, by constantly complaining about what the Europeans are doing and continuing to push them on both economic and security issues, using the threat of withdrawal. But Trump may increase his demands in return for this “paternalism”. It will probably insist on raising the NATO defense spending target to 3 percent at the NATO summit in The Hague next June.
[1] https://koerber-stiftung.de/en/projects/the-berlin-pulse/2024-25/
[2] https://www.euronews.com/business/2024/11/13/why-are-european-defence-stocks-skyrocketing-after-trumps-victory
This article has been published by Anadolu Agency (in Turkish) on November 20, 2024.
