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The relationship between the UK and Germany can generally be characterized as an effective but muted alliance. However, relations gained momentum after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, intensified after Brexit, and reached a new phase with the Russia-Ukraine War. Despite this recovery, political factors, different perceptions of geopolitical threats and different strategic cultures have so far been partially insufficient to deepen relations in concrete ways.
On October 23, UK Defense Secretary John Healey and German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius signed a defense agreement, opening a new chapter in UK-German military cooperation. The Trinity House Agreement guides the deepening relationship between Europe’s two highest defense spenders and focuses on increasing military cooperation in all areas: air, land, sea, space and cyber. It is an important step for NATO and European security, and is critical to strengthening the collective defense capabilities of both countries.
The agreement envisages cooperation in different ways. First, there will be a focus on strengthening NATO’s eastern flank in the Baltic States to provide a more coherent and effective deterrent against a potential attack from Russia, and joint exercises and training between the British and German militaries. The two countries will share logistics, storage and supply capabilities, improving operational efficiency and reducing costs. According to the agreement, land forces will be ready to defend NATO territory in the event of an attack. On the other hand, the German “P8 Poseidon” maritime patrol aircraft will operate “periodically” from the RAF Lossiemouth base in Scotland to enhance security in the North Atlantic, provide enhanced surveillance and operational capabilities to protect vital sea lanes and, above all, to report the entry of Russian submarines into the Atlantic from the Barents Sea.
There are also articles of cooperation between the two countries in the defense industry. These include large-caliber artillery barrels, long-range missiles, manned platforms such as UAVs and future 6th generation fighter jets, and similar products. It also pledges to work in close coordination with other allies, such as France, to ensure that European defense systems remain at the cutting edge of military technology.
Security concerns in Europe and the effects of Brexit
As a result of the recent increase in threats, the European Union (EU) is trying to increase the defense capacity of both the Union structurally and the member states through new institutions, decisions and funds. However, policymakers do not have a strong hand to ensure that all these expenditures can strengthen the defense mechanism. European governments therefore want to work more with militarily strong allies in the region. But the Union has been hit by the departure of a member state with one of the two largest defense budgets. In theory, it is clear that the UK has a lot to offer to European security and defense and that the remaining EU governments want to benefit from British experience, relationships and assets. Even after Brexit, everyone agrees that a defense issue affecting the EU and its member states will directly affect the UK’s national interests and vice versa.
Nevertheless, the EU is looking for something more substantial in European arms policy. The fact that industrial interests play an important role should be interpreted in the context of the fact that the major countries in the Union have their own arms companies, which partly compete with each other. The British defense industry, on the other hand, is one of the largest on the continent and is not immune to competition within the EU. However, since the EU defense fund is linked to the EU internal market, so far only companies from EU and EEA countries can participate in it, and the British are not in demand.
On the other hand, a growing security debate across Europe – the uncertainty of how Donald Trump’s possible return to the White House will affect NATO and the war in Ukraine in particular – has led to calls for Europe to take more responsibility for its own defense and the rise of the idea of strategic autonomy.
Without the UK, it seems difficult for Europe to achieve strategic autonomy in general. Over the past 15 years, the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) has demonstrated that strategic autonomy requires strong leadership from member states. The conduct of operations within the Union will become increasingly difficult without the UK. Indeed, during the period of the UK’s membership, it was announced that it had a considerable proportion of military personnel and equipment in the EU force build-up.
Efforts for a deal despite Brexit
The deal appears to be part of a wider plan to forge closer ties between the UK and its major European allies, both on NATO and bilateral terms. Labour Defense Secretary John Healey’s plan to travel to Ukraine, France, Germany, Estonia and Poland in July, as soon as he takes office, suggests that European security will indeed be the new British government’s top foreign and defense priority.
With Britain and Germany now Europe’s two biggest defense spenders and Ukraine’s two biggest military backers in Europe, London and Berlin are key to the continent’s security. This definition translates into an ambitious partnership that aims to contribute to European deterrence and defense, not only on NATO’s eastern flank, but also in the wider Euro-Atlantic region. The next step would be to relaunch the Lancaster House Agreement signed between the UK and France in 2010. Attempts are underway to overcome the defense-based tensions between the UK and France in 2021 over the AUKUS.
One of the ideas of the Trinity House Treaty is to strengthen these three major European countries through bilateral agreements. The UK envisions unity in European defense, but does not want to risk reopening the Brexit debate by initiating a negotiation process with the EU for an institutional security and defense union. On the other hand, the current conditions for the participation of third countries in EU defense initiatives without formal unity remain unacceptable to London. Therefore, London will probably try to keep its more immediate bilateral objectives in line with its plans for an EU-UK security relationship.
This article has been published by Anadolu Agency (in Turkish) on November 01, 2024.
