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Central Asia holds significant strategic importance as a natural bridge between the Far East and Europe. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the balance of power in the region was reshaped. In this context, Turkic communities in Central Asia established independent states, and new actors emerged in the region. In order to enhance cultural cooperation among themselves and to position as a strong strategic actor in the region, Turkic states established the Cooperation Council of Turkic-Speaking States, also known as the Turkic Council, with the Nakhchivan Agreement in 2009. Since then, member states have strengthened their institutional and economic relations, holding various summits at the level of ministers and heads of state and signing numerous agreements. As a continuation of this process, during the Council of Heads of State held in Istanbul in 2021, the organization was renamed the Organization of Turkic States (OTS), elevating institutional relations among member countries to a higher level.
The member states of the Organization of Turkic States have deepened their relations by cooperating across numerous sectors, including politics, migration, environment, economy, education, health, and energy. In this context, the coordination developed particularly in the field of transportation carries strategic importance. The cooperation among OTS member states in transportation has largely focused on the Middle Corridor project. The Middle Corridor, officially known as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, is a multimodal land and maritime transportation route that starts in China, passes through Kazakhstan, crosses the Caspian Sea to the South Caucasus and Türkiye, and then extends to Europe. In this framework, the Middle Corridor aims to enhance connectivity between East and West by envisioning the revival of the historic Silk Road.
Overall, the Middle Corridor is considered a more advantageous route in terms of distance and time compared to other corridors (the Northern and Southern Corridors) within the scope of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, announced in 2013.
In particular, due to the effects of the Russia–Ukraine war, security challenges in the Red Sea, and the impact of the Israel/US–Iran tensions in the Middle East on the political conjuncture, the Middle Corridor has begun to gain importance as an alternative route to existing maritime routes, as well as to the Northern and Southern Corridors. In this context, international stakeholders such as China and the European Union have strengthened their relations with Central Asian and Caucasus countries and invested in infrastructure projects linked to the Middle Corridor. Accordingly, the Middle Corridor project has begun to evolve beyond its economic dimension into a political phenomenon in the eyes of Central Asian countries and global actors.
Within this framework, the study will analyze the strategic dimensions of the Middle Corridor, assess the cooperation undertaken by the OTS in this context, and examine the strategic opportunities and geopolitical risks that the Middle Corridor presents for OTS member states. Finally, in light of this information, it will discuss whether the Middle Corridor project constitutes an integration effort within the OTS or serves as a strategic balancing element.
The Geopolitical Dimension of the Middle Corridor
This section will aim to explain the geopolitical dimension of the Middle Corridor project. In this context, comparing the Middle Corridor with existing routes (the Northern Corridor, the Southern Corridor, and the Maritime Route) is critical for understanding the vital significance of the project for regional actors. Additionally, it will become apparent why cooperation among OTS member states within the Middle Corridor project is not merely a choice but a strategic necessity.
Over time, the Middle Corridor project has emerged not only as an economic initiative but also as a key geopolitical instrument in the transformation of Eurasia. The Trans-Caspian East-West Middle Corridor Initiative, which extends from Türkiye through Georgia and Azerbaijan to the Caucasus, the Caspian Sea, and Turkestan, holds critical importance for the revival of the historic Silk Road. The Middle Corridor represents a significant component of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, announced by Chinese President Xi Jinping as part of the “Chinese Dream,” alongside the Northern and Southern Corridors. The rising geopolitical significance of the Middle Corridor can be explained by the changing political conjuncture affecting alternative routes.
With the outbreak of the Russia–Ukraine war in 2022, the European Union (EU) imposed various sanctions on the Russian Federation. Within the framework of these sanctions, the EU aimed not only to reduce its energy dependence on Russia but also to decrease its geographical dependence on Russia in trade with China. In this context, the political instabilities in the region, combined with the sanctions, reduced transit activity along the Northern Route by 40%. Moreover, the Middle Corridor is considered a more efficient transportation route, as it is 3,000 km shorter than the Northern Corridor.
The Southern Corridor, considered another alternative route for trade between China and Europe, passes through Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Iran before reaching Türkiye. Due to the sanctions imposed on Iran for many years, this route has never been regarded by the European Union and China as a primary route for the Belt and Road Initiative. In particular, considering the war between Israel/US and Iran that began on February 28, 2026, the Middle Corridor stands out as a safer and more stable alternative compared to the Southern Corridor.
Due to the long transit time of the maritime route, it is less preferred compared to the other corridors. In this context, the Northern Route offers an average transit time of 14–18 days, the Middle Corridor 16–20 days, while the maritime route has a transit time ranging from 28 to 40 days. Moreover, as a result of security challenges in the Red Sea, it is estimated that maritime transport capacity through the Red Sea decreased by 20% by the end of 2023. From this perspective, the Middle Corridor emerges as a more attractive alternative to the maritime route in terms of both transit time and security.
Overall, the Russia–Ukraine war, security challenges in the Red Sea, and recent conflicts in the Middle East have made it necessary for trade between China and the EU to pass through a more stable route. In this context, the Middle Corridor project, which bypasses both Russia and Iran and passes through Azerbaijan via the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars (BTK) Railway, including Georgia and Türkiye, has emerged as an alternative to other Belt and Road Initiative routes (the Northern and Southern Corridors) and the maritime route in terms of both security and transit time, gaining greater geopolitical significance compared to these routes.
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