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NATO’s military planning and its ability to act in a crisis have long been shaped around the American presence. Although European countries have their own armed forces and defence industries, they still rely on capabilities provided by Washington in areas such as intelligence, logistics, air defence and nuclear deterrence. A reduction in the U.S. military presence on the continent would therefore mean more than the redeployment of a certain number of troops. It would raise the question of who would provide Europe’s security, with which capabilities, and how quickly.
This makes the Pentagon’s review of roughly 80,000 U.S. troops stationed in Europe, its bases and allied defence contributions important. A complete U.S. withdrawal from Europe appears unlikely, but Washington clearly expects its European allies to assume a larger share of the defence burden. This expectation is closely linked to the growing focus of U.S. foreign policy on the Indo-Pacific. The timing of the debate, however, matters. With the Russia-Ukraine war continuing and security concerns persisting on NATO’s eastern flank, any change in the American presence directly affects the Alliance’s deterrence.
Europe’s central problem is that higher defence spending has not yet produced sufficient military capability. In recent years, many European states have increased ammunition production, launched new defence programmes and raised military budgets. Even so, Europe remains dependent on the United States for long-range transport, satellite and intelligence infrastructure, integrated air defence and nuclear protection. These capability gaps cannot be closed quickly. A smaller U.S. military presence would therefore not automatically make Europe more independent; initially, it would intensify security concerns and debates over responsibility within NATO.
European states are unlikely to respond to this change in the same way. Poland and the Baltic states view the threat from Russia as immediate and regard the U.S. security guarantee as indispensable. France argues that Europe must strengthen its capacity for strategic autonomy, while Germany is trying to balance the two approaches. Northern European countries, meanwhile, are deepening regional cooperation. These differences could reinforce security partnerships along the Nordic-Baltic line or the France-Germany-Poland axis. Without a common understanding of threats and capabilities, however, groups with different priorities may emerge within NATO.
The analysis begins with the following question: What kind of security order would a possible reduction in the U.S. military presence create in Europe? It examines whether this change will produce new defence partnerships that increase Europe’s strategic responsibility and whether it will heighten tensions within the Alliance on NATO’s eastern flank. Its purpose is not to discuss in the abstract whether Europe can become wholly independent of the United States, but to understand how security responsibilities would be distributed, among whom, and with which capabilities.
If European states cannot rely fully on U.S. security support, they may accelerate their search for new defence partnerships. Türkiye is an actor that must be considered in this process. Its importance to European states stems not only from its geography but also from its possession of one of NATO’s largest armed forces and an advanced defence industry. The analysis therefore considers existing defence cooperation between Türkiye and European countries, as well as the areas in which such cooperation could be expanded.
The central argument is that a reduction in the U.S. military presence in Europe would not give the continent strategic autonomy in the short term. A more likely outcome is closer cooperation among European states in particular regions. Yet Europe still lacks the capacity to replace American deterrence fully. The analysis first assesses Europe’s dependence on the United States for security and the risks on the eastern flank. It then examines Nordic-Baltic cooperation, the France-Germany-Poland axis, and existing or possible defence partnerships with Türkiye. The final section considers whether this change would move NATO towards more balanced burden-sharing or towards a more fragmented and fragile structure.
The U.S. military role in Europe cannot be explained solely by temporary disagreements between Washington and European capitals. The more durable driver is the distribution of resources across different threat theatres in U.S. defence planning. Published in January 2026, the U.S. National Defense Strategy prioritises homeland defence and balancing China in the Indo-Pacific. It also calls on European allies to assume responsibility for threats in their own region. The document indicates that continuing U.S. support will be more limited and concentrated on critical areas. A possible reduction in the American presence in Europe should therefore be understood not as an abrupt break, but as the result of a long-running shift in priorities (U.S. Department of Defense, 2026).
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