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The global power hierarchy, shaped around coal in the 19th century and oil in the 20th century, is gradually being replaced by “critical minerals,” which have become strategic instruments alongside the technological developments of the 21st century. Today, elements such as lithium, cobalt, nickel, and rare earth metals form the fundamental building blocks not only for civilian innovations like electric vehicles and renewable energy but also for defense industry applications, including artificial intelligence, UAV systems, and missile technologies. The supply security of these minerals acts as a lifeline that directly determines the technological competence and international security capacities of modern states.
As the global transition in energy and technology becomes increasingly dependent on raw materials, supply chains are rapidly being securitized. Consequently, economic investments in the extraction and processing of raw materials are now viewed as a crucial instrument of foreign policy. In a multipolar world order, this process creates tension between the great powers’ pursuit of strategic autonomy and the economic counter-moves they develop against their rivals. Therefore, this study aims to analyze how the intense competition over critical minerals is restructuring the distribution of power in the international system and how economic dependencies are being integrated into national security strategies.
China’s monopolization strategy in the critical minerals supply chain goes beyond a mere search for economic raw materials, transforming into a geoeconomic foreign policy tool that shapes global power balances. The Beijing administration pursues a commercial diplomacy that significantly differs from Western actors, particularly in resource-rich regions like Africa; it secures long-term operating rights in strategic mining sites in exchange for large-scale loans and rapid infrastructure investments. Through this model, China does not merely extract minerals from the ground. By constructing ports, railways, and power plants, it also establishes fully integrated control over the logistics networks that ensure the direct flow of raw materials into its own industry (Bardakçı, 2025). Consequently, this resource diplomacy implemented by China not only provides a strategic advantage and deterrence against the West during the transition to multipolarity in the international system, but it also directly translates mining investments into the construction of geopolitical influence.
On the other hand, the Western bloc’s most prominent counter-move against China’s overwhelming superiority in the extraction and, especially, refining of critical minerals is the “friend-shoring” strategy, which involves shifting supply chains to reliable allied nations. The most concrete institutional outcome of this strategy is the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP), established in 2022 under the leadership of the US and the European Union to ensure the secure and sustainable supply of critical minerals like rare earth elements, lithium, nickel, and cobalt. Unlike traditional and cumbersome international organizations, the MSP is designed as a flexible and “transgovernmental” cooperation network capable of rapidly adapting to changing geopolitical conditions. Indeed, due to its structure and goals, this formation—often described in public discourse as a “NATO for metals”—aims to prevent rivals like China from disrupting Western economies by turning their strategic market advantages into diplomatic leverage (Dursun & Erhan Bulut, 2025). The MSP, which Türkiye joined in 2024 and which had over 30 members, was restructured under the umbrella of FORGE (Forum on Resource Geostrategic Engagement) in February 2026, increasing its membership to 54 countries plus the EU.
In light of all these geoeconomic moves and counter-strategies, the competition shaped around critical minerals is expected to result in raw material monopolies being used as a foreign policy weapon in the international system in the future. Furthermore, this rivalry creates a new spiral of insecurity that threatens international peace through asymmetrical dependencies. Consequently, critical minerals, which continue to be a ‘securitized’ object, will be one of the most fundamental geostrategic fault lines determining countries’ deterrence capacities, conflict risks, and global stability over the next decade. This analysis aims to present an evaluation in light of all these circumstances.
China’s Vertical Integration Strategy and Its Concrete Manifestations on the Ground
The dominance of the People’s Republic of China over critical minerals relies on its state-supported “vertical integration” strategy, which has been implemented for over two decades, rather than a mere geographical advantage. Through this strategy, China builds a geoeconomic hegemony over its rivals by establishing a vertical monopoly not only in the raw material extraction phase but also in refining and global logistics networks. By conducting commercial diplomacy integrated with the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China ties mining sites, particularly in the Global South, to itself through infrastructure investments. The most concrete example of this can be seen in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which accounts for approximately 70% of the global cobalt supply. In exchange for commitments to build roads, hospitals, and energy infrastructure (such as the Sicamines agreement), Chinese companies largely acquire the operating rights to the largest cobalt and copper mines in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. A similar strategy is evident in the case of nickel, which is of critical importance for electric vehicle batteries. Following Indonesia’s ban on raw nickel exports, major Chinese companies like Tsingshan have achieved a monopoly position in the country’s nickel processing facilities through multi-billion dollar investments. Furthermore, even if China is not the country extracting the raw materials from the ground, it currently holds 60% to 80% of the global refining capacity for lithium, cobalt, and rare earth elements on its own. Kalantzakos (2020) states that this structural dominance creates a serious vulnerability for Western actors; even if access to raw materials is secured, this concentration in processing capacity makes global supply security dependent on China’s decisions. This structure can create an asymmetrical bottleneck in which Western companies remain dependent on China for processing, even if they extract minerals from Africa or Latin America.
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