No Events
When Ukrainian forces crossed the border from the Sumy region into the Kursk Oblast (Federal District) on August 6, the Russian army was caught off guard. It came at a moment when the Russian defenses were weak and unprepared. After months of gradual advances by Moscow’s forces in eastern Ukraine, this offensive took the Kremlin and the Russian army by surprise.
This time, the attack was not led primarily by small units of pro-Ukrainian Russian nationals and various other foreign formations, as was the case in the numerous attacks in 2023 and early 2024. According to the latest information, several new Ukrainian brigades have been included in the Kursk attacks, and armored units have begun to appear close to the front lines. Moscow’s statement claimed that the Ukrainian forces are part of the army’s 22nd Mechanized Brigade. That is, not volunteers, but experienced and seasoned soldiers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, experienced in the heaviest conflicts, including in the Bakhmut region. According to information from Russia, Ukraine started this operation with an attack by about 1,000 Ukrainian troops supported by tanks and armored vehicles. In contrast, Russia continues to deploy in large numbers to the ongoing fighting in Donetsk, Kharkov and Zaporizhia regions, and while reserves are being prepared in the background, weaker and lower quality defenses remain on the ground in some parts of the border. Russia’s Kursk border was controlled by border control forces due to insufficient numbers of soldiers on duty. Although they were later reinforced with conscripts, these were young Russian soldiers with little experience in such attacks. On the second day of the attack, Ukrainian media reported that dozens of Russian soldiers surrendered to Ukraine in Russia’s Kursk Oblast.
The declaration of a “federal state of emergency” in the Kursk Oblast demonstrates once again how serious the situation is. Despite the deployment of reserve troops and evacuation orders, Russia has failed to slow the pace of Ukraine’s advance. Ukraine seized control of nearly 1,000 square kilometers of Russian territory as Kiev launched its largest cross-border offensive. This is the deepest cross-border advance by Kiev since Moscow launched its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. On the other hand, it is the biggest challenge for the Russian leader since the uprising of Wagner mercenaries in June 2023.
Why Did The Ukrainian Army Enter Russian Territory?
Ukraine’s surprise incursion clearly has various political or military reasons and implications.
Ukraine wants to put pressure on Moscow by seizing as much Russian territory as possible. This would strengthen Ukraine’s hand in possible peace talks with Russia. Ukrainian territory occupied by Russia could be exchanged for Russian territory occupied by Ukraine.
As a military strategy, the advance into Russian territory could also create a buffer zone for the population in the disputed regions of Ukraine. In addition, the advance is aimed at weakening the Russian army. The Sudzha axis, where the attack is concentrated, is located on one of the main rail lines, the Lgov-Belgorod railway, which leads to Belgorod, the main logistics depot of the Russian Task Group in Kharkiv. It could also force Russia to deploy more troops to the embattled border region and thus weaken the Russian army along the main front line in Ukraine.
In addition to these frontline tactics, Ukraine is also seeking to exploit the general military situation. One of them is to establish a presence on Russian territory in order to expose Putin’s talk about Russian red lines and frequent threats of nuclear escalation as a bluff designed to scare the West.
On the other hand, it is also an important move by the Ukrainian leadership to show Russia, and especially the West, that Ukraine is not doomed. Kiev wants to show that it can still win the war with more shipments of Western weapons. The US, Germany and other Western partners have long banned Ukraine from using its weapons to directly attack Russian territory. Ukrainian troops received authorization for the first time in May, after a new Russian attack on Kharkiv, but it was limited to their own territory. Long-range ballistic missiles supplied by Washington, such as the ATACMS, can still only be fired from occupied Ukrainian territory.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said in a statement that Ukraine was targeting “the areas where the Russian military launched an attack on our Sumy,” adding that the operation was purely a security issue for Ukraine. The message seems to have been designed to appease Western allies who were hesitant about the use of their weapons in the operation. While some American politicians have welcomed the move, others, such as the UK and Italy, remain negative.
In addition to military reasons, Ukraine’s intention to strike at Russia through secondary channels should be taken into account. The region is of high economic and energy importance. The Sudzha gas transfer and measuring stations are the only entry point into the Ukrainian gas transmission system for the transportation of Russian natural gas to Europe. According to data from Reuters, currently, about 42 million cubic meters of gas still pass through Sudzha every day. The total annual transit volume is about 14 billion cubic meters.[1]
Kursk, the Oblast capital, is more than 81 kilometers from Sudzha, and although there have been suggestions that Kiev is aiming to seize the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant, it is unlikely that Ukraine will be able to reach it. Nevertheless, the UN Nuclear Agency issued a statement urging the two sides to “exercise the utmost restraint” in the face of the risk that the fighting in Kursk could move closer to the nuclear power plant. Rafael Grossi, head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), called on all parties to take measures “to prevent a nuclear accident that could lead to serious radiological consequences”. The Russian National Guard announced increased security around the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant.
What is debated in Ukraine and among observers in the West is not how large a territory it is likely to take or how far it is likely to strike, but whether the operation was motivated by military objectives or the need for positive PR.
The attack motivated the Ukrainian army, which had been fighting for a long time and had failed to make positive progress from the last counter-attack in the summer of 2023, with a success story. It also sent a strong message to Kiev’s allies that the Ukrainian army could seize the initiative in the war. This message is especially important ahead of the US presidential elections.
Russia’s Reaction
An “counter-terrorism operation” has been declared by Moscow in Kursk and the neighboring Belgorod and Bryansk regions. This is the same designation given to the war in Chechnya in the early 2000s, and thus allows the involvement of the army as well as the FSB security services and the Rosgvardia national guard. Local authorities have also been authorized to restrict the movement of people and vehicles, authorize wiretaps and impose temporary evacuations.
The attack also dealt a blow to the Kremlin, exposing its failure to protect the country and shattering Putin’s narrative that Russia is largely unscathed by its enemies. Russian reinforcements, including elite special forces units and experienced Wagner mercenaries, have begun arriving in the Kursk region, but so far they have failed to push Ukrainian troops out of Sudzha and other areas. Ukraine claims to have taken hundreds of Russian prisoners of war and entered some areas with little resistance.
However, there are unconfirmed reports that Russia has shifted some of its troops from northeast Ukraine to Kursk. Despite Ukraine’s desire to relieve pressure on the main front line by pulling Russian forces back to the defense of Kursk and other border areas, the acceleration of the Russian advance to Pokrovsk on the front line suggests that Moscow is not taking the bait.
For Russia, the attack comes just a month after the NATO summit in Washington, which formally handed over direct control of the arming and training of the Ukrainian army to NATO. Ukraine’s Kursk attack was allegedly monitored and coordinated from Washington, Berlin and London. Supporting this perception, the Economist, a leading British publication, hailed the attack, which took place in the same month as the 81st anniversary of Hitler’s defeat in the same region, and declared that the “Second Battle of Kursk” had begun.[2]
The conflict on Russian territory has also reignited the question of whether Ukraine is using weapons supplied by NATO members. While it is not clear what weapons Ukraine used at the border, Russian media reported that American Bradley and German Marder armored infantry vehicles were there. Ukrainian forces also allegedly used Polish supplied PT-91 Twardy tanks, 9K33M2 Osa missile systems and Rosomak armored vehicles in the attack.
In Moscow’s view, if it is tolerated for Ukraine to use NATO weapons to attack Russia, it would be tolerated for NATO troops to attack Russia directly. The next “red line” NATO is likely to cross could be the deployment of its own troops, including a military attack on Crimea.
Russian President Putin has already publicly stated that an attack on Russian territory would be met with the use of nuclear weapons. According to the Russians, NATO forces are almost daring Russia to fulfill this threat, an action that would trigger not only a full-scale war between Russia and NATO, but also a thermonuclear exchange that could destroy all of humanity.
Is Ukraine Undermining Itself?
Ukraine has taken risks by advancing on Russian territory and may end up losing more troops than Russia.
Despite initial successes, this campaign against Russia could lead to losses of Ukraine’s most capable troops and deprive the troops in Donetsk of vital reinforcements. Moreover, Russia could benefit the most, as the extension of the front line into Russian territory would further strain Ukraine’s armed forces. This, coupled with Ukraine’s lack of tangible gains in its previous attacks on Russia, has led to discussions that the resources used and potential losses suffered by Kiev in the attack could be offset by possible strategic gains.
For Ukrainian forces, establishing a permanent presence in the Kursk region will be challenging, as supply lines will be vulnerable to Russian gunfire and Ukraine has limited reserves at its disposal.
On the other hand, the operation could also undermine Ukraine’s claims under international law. Ukraine’s newfound fighting power, thanks to sustained military support from the West, is highly influential in the planning and execution of this attack. This makes the self-defense provision of UN Article 51 questionable.
Conclusion
It is becoming very difficult for Ukraine to continue fighting this war as it has been doing for the last two years. It does not have the manpower or the ammunition stockpile to do so. Russia has a much larger army and Ukraine cannot continue to fight on equal terms with Russia. Instead of confronting the Russian army, which is superior in many respects, on an open battlefield, it is clear that Ukraine needs to use tactics more appropriate to the current strength and weaponry of its forces. There have been increasing suggestions that if it wants to stay in the war, it must adopt a much more asymmetric style of warfare.
But this attack, too, has its limits. The further the Ukrainian army advances, the greater the risk that its supply routes will be cut off, and Ukraine is clearly not planning a conflict in which it sends troops towards Moscow or carries out airstrikes in that direction.
Of course, this attack is a step towards further escalation and there are additional risks as we do not know how Russia will react. The hope is that the daring seizure of territory by Ukrainian troops will encourage Putin to make concessions, but the Kremlin is now even more hardened. In fact, former Russian President and current Deputy Chairman of the Russian Federation Security Council Dmitry Medvedev called on Russian forces to seize Kiev and other Ukrainian cities in the wake of the attack.
For this reason, Ukrainian troops, fearful of the Kremlin’s sudden annihilation attacks, may not choose to advance any further, but may make other sudden maneuvers to destabilize Russia. The important thing is for Kiev to maintain balance and show that it is paying attention to its Western partners.
[1] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/gas-transit-flows-are-normal-amid-reported-clashes-near-russias-sudzha-kyiv-says-2024-08-07/
[2] https://www.economist.com/europe/2024/08/08/ukraine-surprises-with-a-high-stakes-raid-into-russia
This article has been published by Anadolu Agency (in Turkish) on August 16, 2024.
