No Events
The European Union’s (EU) latest step towards rearmament, SAFE (Security Action for Europe), is an investment-financing instrument that has emerged as a new defense and security mechanism.
One of the program’s most important technical features is that it supports projects using funds obtained by the EU Commission through borrowing from the market. In this context, SAFE is not a permanent tool, but rather an “exceptional and temporary response” to the need to significantly increase Europe’s defense capabilities. The loans are planned to be distributed by the end of 2030 and repaid within 45 years.
SAFE is also part of a broader package of measures under the “ Readiness 2030” strategy (formerly ReArm Europe), which aims to ensure that Europe avoids some of the wasteful practices that characterize its defense spending. Despite the increase in defense spending in recent years, the European defense market remains fragmented, and countries are often forced to produce relatively small quantities of weapons at high cost. This situation leads to inefficient spending and interoperability issues in European defense systems.
This is where the “European preference” mechanism comes into play. The requirement that at least 65% of the weapons and equipment to be procured must be produced in EU member states or in the European Free Trade Association (EFTA)/European Economic Area (EEA) region allows the remaining 35% to consist of components sourced from third countries.
In practice, SAFE seeks to go beyond being a technical mechanism; it is seen as a tool that will also determine choices, cooperation with external partners, ethical/political criteria, technological security, and the EU’s strategic orientation.
What does this mean for European security?
Europe’s security architecture has faced serious challenges, particularly with the Russia-Ukraine War. The Russian threat, supply chain disruptions, and uncertainty over the continuity of NATO-US ties have brought to the fore the need to strengthen Europe’s own defense capabilities.
For some time now, especially under the influence of Donald Trump’s presidency, Europe has wanted to develop its capacity to act independently in a crisis situation. In this regard, the SAFE Program was planned as an important and pioneering tool for Europe to achieve strategic autonomy by reducing its dependence on external sources for defense. To achieve this autonomy, rather than countries undertaking large arms systems projects individually, economies of scale must be achieved through joint EU-wide projects, and supply chain integrity must be established. It is expected that the partnerships established through SAFE will achieve this, thereby enabling capacity building and integration.
The cost of this armament process must not lead to an economic model that would mean “sacrificing welfare,” which is what Europe fears most. According to the plan, SAFE loans will be offered on attractive terms over the long term. Low-cost financing will be created using resources pooled by the European Commission based on its high credit rating (AAA). This will also reduce the costs that could arise from the creditworthiness of many countries and provide financial efficiency. Furthermore, the EU taking on a more active budgetary role in an area such as defense could be a valuable political signal, serving as a tool to support the institutionalization of European defense policy at the EU level.
Alongside these positive effects, there are also some risks. The fact that third-country components are under EU control may limit cooperation with some external partners. Member states may wish to preserve their own initiatives in defense projects, which could create tension in coordination and decision-making processes at the EU level. Perhaps most importantly, the EU’s normative conditions, such as democratic criteria and foreign policy compatibility, could become “political breaking points” in the participation process.
What does Turkiye’s participation in the SAFE Program bring to Europe?
The possibility of Turkiye joining the SAFE program represents not only a technical partnership but also a geopolitical test for the European defense architecture. Ankara’s participation could mean both strategic capacity and operational flexibility for Europe. However, this depends not only on technical capabilities but also on the development of political trust.
Firstly, Turkiye’s advanced defense industry capacity could provide a significant contribution to Europe within the SAFE framework. Turkish defense companies have been producing competitive solutions in recent years in areas such as unmanned aerial vehicles, electronic warfare systems, armored vehicle technologies, and smart munitions. This directly aligns with SAFE’s goals of joint innovation projects and cost-effective production.
At the same time, the flexibility of Turkiye’s production infrastructure can alleviate the supply chain bottlenecks that Europe faces in times of war or crisis. Current European defense supply chains may be dependent on a few major suppliers. With Turkiye’s participation, the supply chain can be diversified, and spare capacity opportunities can increase. Furthermore, Turkiye’s strategic location between Europe and Asia offers logistical advantages. It can provide transit advantages for defense industry projects, particularly along the Mediterranean, Aegean, and Black Sea axes.
As the country with NATO’s second-largest army, Turkiye has long played a strategic role in the European security architecture, and formalizing this role within the SAFE framework will yield geopolitical gains. Firstly, Turkiye’s inclusion in SAFE aligns NATO’s effectiveness on its southern flank with EU projects. This could serve as an “institutional bridge” at a time when transatlantic ties are weakening. Furthermore, Europe’s defense vision now extends beyond the continent to regional crisis areas. Turkiye has the capacity to make this vision “transnational” through its activities in the Mediterranean, Black Sea, Middle East, and Central Asia.
On the other hand, Ankara’s contribution to EU defense initiatives could also redefine Turkiye-EU relations, which have weakened in recent years, on a new basis. Cooperation in the defense industry could facilitate the gradual rebuilding of political trust.
Is Greece’s veto possible?
The most talked-about development in Turkiye’s SAFE program participation process was Greece’s threat to veto it. Athens’ veto is ostensibly based on Turkiye’s “casus belli” (cause for war) decision. Greece has clearly stated that it will not support Ankara’s participation in SAFE unless Turkiye revokes the 1995 decision of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM) to extend its territorial waters in the Aegean to 12 miles, which Greece considers a casus belli. However, this justification is merely the visible face of a much deeper strategic reckoning.
Athens’ primary goal is to make its security concerns “a common European issue” within the EU’s new defense architecture. Greece sees SAFE as an opportunity to bring its bilateral disputes with Turkiye to the EU level and transform its national security concerns into institutional protection. Furthermore, Greece wants to strengthen its image as “the country defending Europe’s borders” in the eyes of its domestic public.
On the other hand, this veto is a tool for Greece to expand its political maneuvering space within the EU. Greece’s “right to say no on its own” in major strategic projects such as SAFE increases Athens’ diplomatic influence and is expected to occasionally elevate it to the position of a “key country” in EU internal negotiations.
However, it is unclear whether Greece’s veto will constitute a completely absolute obstacle. Under EU internal law, the principle of qualified majority, rather than unanimity, can be applied in some projects. Furthermore, countries such as Germany and Spain are seeking to soften the veto by calling on Greece to adopt a “constructive stance” on this issue. One scenario being discussed in Brussels is for Turkiye to be included in the process under the SAFE framework with “limited participation” or “joint project level cooperation” status instead of full membership. This would preserve Greece’s objection while allowing cooperation to proceed in practice.
Under these conditions, Greece’s veto presents a test not only for Turkiye but also for Europe: Can the EU develop a common security vision that transcends national interests, or will each country act according to its own historical baggage?
This article has been published by Anadolu Agency (in Turkish) on October 31, 2025.
