

# THE PEZESHKIAN ADMINISTRATION IN IRAN: CHANGE OR CONTINUITY?

March 2025 No: 51



## THE PEZESHKIAN ADMINISTRATION IN IRAN: CHANGE OR CONTINUITY?

In Iran, which has an ancient political tradition, in the Islamic Republic of Iran, which was established after the Islamic Revolution; thanks to the principle of velayat-i faqih put forward by Khomeini and one of the pillars of the regime, “ulema” play a decisive role in the country’s politics. In the post-revolutionary years under the rule of Ayatollahs, who are members of the ulema, Iran has had a turbulent political environment due to its geopolitical location, relations with the USA and political instability in the region. Finally, on May 19, 2024, in the elections held under the shadow of the crisis environment that emerged with the death of President Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash, Masoud Pezeshkian became the new President of Iran. However, an interesting detail is that the elections had the lowest turnout rate in the Islamic Republic period, at 40%. The people’s “decreased belief in change and apathy towards elections” stand out as the reasons for the low turnout rate. Pezeshkian’s statements on the rights of young people and women are important in terms of the relationship to be established with the people. On the other hand, the new President; his commitment to religious rule poses a serious obstacle to reform in these areas, since such decisions are made by the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. However, Pezeshkian’s statements still have the potential to have a significant impact on Khamenei’s decisions.

The policies that Pezeshkian, who says he is proud of his “Turkish” identity, will follow regarding the Turks and Azeris living in Iran also stand out as an important issue in terms of the relations that the new administration in Iran will establish with the people. Because there are nearly 30 million Azeri-Turks living in Iran and this minority constitutes a significant portion of the population. At a time when the ties between the administration and the people in Iran have been seriously damaged compared to the first years of the Revolution, the bond that Pezeshkian will establish with the people will affect the internal dynamics of Iran and the course of the Islamic Regime. On the other hand, this bond will hold an important place in determining how Iran, which is in a critical position in the Middle East, which is becoming more and more complicated by the day, will look ahead. In the analysis titled “The New Administration in Iran: Change or Continuity?”; Pezeshkian’s relations with the public after coming to power, the policies he followed to establish these relations, the steps Pezeshkian took in foreign policy after coming to power, the relations established with Türkiye, the reactions of the Islamic government to these policies, and the possibility of Pezeshkian to make a radical change in Iran will be examined.

### The Process of the New Administration Coming to Power in Iran

Considering that President Masoud Pezeshkian assumed office in Iran after a major crisis, it is important to shed light on how the process before the election is progressing. After the deaths of the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran

Raisi, Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdullahiyan and those accompanying him in the helicopter that crashed in East Azerbaijan on May 19, 2024, Iran experienced a great shock. Following the reassuring statements of the religious leader Ali Khamenei that the system would not be disrupted, June 28, 2024 was determined as the date for the presidential

election. The blockage in the system due to the paving of the way for the President through electoral engineering in the previous elections and the hopelessness that arose in the people who were going to enter the election due to this, ensured that the hopes of many groups were revived in the first election without the Raisi.<sup>1</sup> Because in Iran, where there is now an entrenched and monotonous election system; the first election without a leader brought with it many possibilities. In Iran, where a total of 81 candidates applied for candidacy for the presidency; GCC (Guardian Council of the Constitution) approved 6 names. The Islamic administration directly intervenes in the political arena in Iran by determining the candidates who will enter the presidential elections. With the withdrawal of two of the names approved by GCC from candidacy, the elections were held with a total of four candidates. In the elections where Mesud Pezeshkian, Said Celili, Muhammed Baqir Qalibaf and Mustafa Purmuhammedi competed, the participation was quite low, Mesud Pezeshkian came first with 42.6% and the election went to the second round.

After a long time, the emergence of Masoud Pezeshkian as a reformist candidate again and his approval in the elections created a wave of excitement among reformists who were pushed out of the system. The Itimad newspaper dated June 23, 2024 stated that Pezeshkian defined himself as “Khatemi’s third government” and followed a similar path. On the other hand, as stated in Hemmihen’s news dated June 26, 2024,

former President Mohammad Khatami announced his official support for reformist candidate Masoud Pezeshkian. In his video message, Khatami emphasized that the country needed change and reform, and praised Pezeshkian’s honesty, clean past, and commitment to revolutionary ideals.<sup>2</sup> The second round of elections was held on July 5, and Masoud Pezeshkian was elected as the new president of Iran by receiving 53.7% of the votes.

The low turnout rate in the elections has been an important piece of data in terms of showing the public’s distrust of the system and their hopelessness for change. This situation, which has received widespread coverage in the press, has also brought about various analyses. In a column published in Hemşehri Newspaper on June 30, 2024, Editor-in-Chief Muhsin Mehdiyan categorized those who did not vote as “those who could not participate, those who accepted the system but did not vote in protest, those who voted only in cases of polarization and those who were undecided” and put forward the issues of “decreased belief in change and disinterest in elections” as the reasons for the low turnout. Again in his column in İttılaat Newspaper on June 30, 2024, Fethullah Cevadi determined that the low turnout rate, despite the more reasonable behavior of the Guardian Council of the Constitution (GCC) and efforts to increase diversity in elections, constituted a serious problem for the “republican” aspect of the Islamic Republic. Cevadi also drew attention to the fact that there were significant changes in the elections despite the low turnout. The

<sup>1</sup> “İran Basınında Öne Çıkanlar (25-30 Mayıs)”, İRAM Center | İran Araştırmaları Merkezi, 03.06.2024, (Online) <https://www.iramcenter.org/iran-basininda-one-cikanlar-25-30-mayis-2496>, 17.02.2025.

<sup>2</sup> “İran Basınında Öne Çıkanlar (22-27 Haziran)”, İRAM Center | İran Araştırmaları Merkezi, 02.07.2024, (Online) <https://www.iramcenter.org/iran-basininda-one-cikanlar-22-27-haziran-2509>, 17.02.2025.

author stated that the candidate who received the most votes in the elections did not fully meet the expectations of the conservative segment, and interpreted this as an indication that there was a desire for change in society, even among the traditional supporters of the regime.<sup>3</sup> When we look at the election results, we see that some of the votes of the moderate conservative voters went to Pezeshkian instead of the radical candidate Celili. Thus, it is possible to say that the cycle of conservatives winning elections in Iran where participation was not high was broken on July 5.<sup>4</sup>

It is a matter of curiosity what kind of policy the reformist Pezeshkian will follow in the face of the widespread desire for change among the people. The reasons why the conservative segment of the population voted for Pezeshkian are that Pezeshkian has a relatively clean political background and is loyal to the religious leader Khamenei. It is important to get to know Pezeshkian, who has been involved in politics for many years, in order to determine what kind of impression the new President has in the minds of Iranians.

Masoud Pezeshkian, who was elected as the 9th President of Iran, was born on September 29, 1954 in Mahabad to an Iranian-Turkish family and has always expressed his pride in his Turkish identity. The event that has remained secret about Pezeshkian, but which has earned him the love of the masses in Iran, was the loss of

his wife and son in a traffic accident in 1994. After the accident, Pezeshkian raised his two sons and a daughter alone and never remarried. As a young rector at the time, Pezeshkian was 40 years old, and his love for his wife and the sacrifices he made ensured that Pezeshkian was known and respected throughout the country.

### The New Administration's Relationship with the Public

The relationship that Masoud Pezeshkian will establish with the people is of great importance. Although he will take office as President in 2024, Pezeshkian, who has been active in politics for many years, has attracted public attention with various statements before his presidency. In a statement he made regarding the Mahsa Amini protests, Pezeshkian said that the headscarf law should end. Speaking to local sources, the leader said, "We want our children to be chaste, but if these behaviors alienate them from religion, we should not continue this method,"<sup>5</sup> and took a stand far from the extreme pro-Islamic regime leaders regarding this incident, which created a serious crisis in the eyes of the people. Pezeshkian, who does not come from the Shiite clergy tradition, will follow a path regarding women's rights. Pezeshkian, who touched on the oppression of women by the morality police in his statements, said: "The morality police should not interfere (with women). I will monitor the situation so that they do not harass women." Pezeshkian

---

<sup>3</sup> "İran Basınında Öne Çıkanlar (29 Haziran 2024 – 5 Temmuz 2024)", **İRAM Center | İran Araştırmaları Merkezi**, 08.07.2024, (Online) <https://www.iramcenter.org/iran-basininda-one-cikanlar-29-haziran-2024-5-temmuz-2024-2514>, 17.02.2025.

<sup>4</sup> Gülriş Şen, "İran'da Cumhurbaşkanı Pezeşkiyan Dönemi: Beklentiler, Zorluklar, İhtimaller",

**Panorama**, 19.07.2024, (Online)

<https://www.uikpanorama.com/blog/2024/07/19/iran-secimler-gs/>, 17.02.2025.

<sup>5</sup> "İran'ın yeni Cumhurbaşkanı Mesud Pezeşkiyan kimdir?", **euronews**, 06.07.2024, (Online)

<https://tr.euronews.com/2024/07/06/iranin-yeni-cumhurbaskani-mesud-pezeskiyan-kimdir>, 26.02.2025.



also promised to oppose the patrols that monitor the mandatory headscarf before the election. He also said he would ease some of the country's long-standing internet controls.<sup>6</sup> All these statements create a positive impression on the majority of the Iranian people regarding one of the biggest concerns in Iran today, the oppression of women first and then of all the Iranian people. The attitude of the President regarding the headscarf obligation, which is one of the biggest reasons for questioning the Islamic Regime, will also play a decisive role in terms of the health of the Regime. Masoud Pezeshkian aims to show the value he gives to women with the cabinet he presents to the parliament.

The confirmation of Pezeshkian's candidate, Farzana Sadik Malvacerd, as Minister of Roads and Urbanization, exactly 11 years after the departure of the first female minister of the Islamic Republic, Marziye Vahid Destcerdi, by the Parliament; Fatima Muhacerani's appointment as the first female government spokesperson in Iran's history; the appointment of another female politician, Şina Ansari, as Vice President and Head of the Environmental Protection Agency; and the appointment of Faiza Dovleti as an advisor and special assistant by the First Vice President, Mohammad Reza Arif; are among the important decisions Pezeshkian has taken regarding the increase in women's representation.<sup>7</sup> Although the cabinet that Pezeshkian announced was formed with the approval

of the Islamic regime, these decisions are important in terms of the new President being able to influence Khamenei and the Ulema. Because, when you consider that a radical reformer who is not on good terms with Khamenei cannot even take office, the policy that Pezeshkian is following seems quite understandable for a reformist President. It is a matter of curiosity whether Khamenei will approach Pezeshkian's line in the process or whether Pezeshkian will be forced to abandon his reformist identity.

One of the most important appointments made by Pezeshkian is that for the first time in the history of the Islamic Republic of Iran, a Sunni politician has become a member of the government. The appointment of Abdülkerim Hosseinzadeh, of Kurdish origin, as Vice President Responsible for Rural Development stands out as an important indicator that Pezeshkian's promises to ethnic and sectarian minorities, whose votes he requested during the election period, will be fulfilled, or at least that he takes their voices and demands into consideration and will receive them. Because the problems experienced by Sunnis, Turks, Kurds, Arabs and Baluch people have affected street protests and alienation from the ballot box in recent years, and have therefore become a major problems for the system.<sup>8</sup> In this way, Pezeshkian aimed to both consolidate his power by fulfilling his promise and to prevent the separatist line that minorities have settled in in recent years.

<sup>6</sup> "İran Cumhurbaşkanı Pezeşkiyan: Ahlak polisi kadınları artık 'rahatsız etmeyecek'", **BBC News Türkçe**, 17.09.2024, (Online) <https://www.bbc.com/turkce/articles/c6255penp2no>, 26.02.2025.

<sup>7</sup> Mustafa Caner, "İran'ın Pezeşkiyan Açılımı", **SETA**, 31.08.2024, (Online)

<https://www.setav.org/yorum/iranin-pezeskiyan-acilimi>, 17.02.2025.

<sup>8</sup> Mustafa Caner, "İran'ın Pezeşkiyan Açılımı", **SETA**, 31.08.2024, (Online)

<https://www.setav.org/yorum/iranin-pezeskiyan-acilimi>, 17.02.2025.

At this point, it is important to reveal the relationship that Khamenei has established with Pezeshkian. Because even the path to the relationship that Pezeshkian will establish with the people goes through Khamenei. During and after the election period, Supreme Leader Khamenei points to former President Ibrahim Raisi as a role model for the new President. In this context, it is obvious that Pezeshkian will not be able to bring about a serious change. It should be noted that Pezeshkian expressed his loyalty to Supreme Leader Khamenei in his election campaign and television debates and that he will work within the red lines of the system. However, Pezeshkian also promises, in line with his reformist identity, to ease the increasingly intense pressure on women to wear the obligatory veil and to lift restrictions on the internet. The slogan "For Iran" that he used in his election campaign was an imitation of the work of Shervin Hajipour, which virtually became the anthem of the rebellion within the country during the 2022 protests, while Pezeshkian said; It aims to normalize politics with the aim of uniting, reconciling and representing all of Iran, and to save Iranians from sanctions by resolving the nuclear issue between Iran and the US.<sup>9</sup>

The public's expectations from a reformist president are of course higher than those of a traditionalist president. However, the guiding power of the religious administration over Pezeshkian clearly continues. The cancellation of Pezeshkian's first press conference with national and international press organizations immediately after the elections, and instead the five-hour long meeting with

religious leader Khamenei, in which he was given advice and warnings, especially regarding the government's policies and the selection of ministers to serve in the cabinet, are examples of this guidance. In Iran today, it is clear that putting the people in the background will make change impossible. On the other hand, Pezeshkian pursuing a policy that is completely independent of Khamenei will shorten the life of the new administration. At this point, Pezeshkian must pursue a policy of balance between the people and the religious administration if he wants to achieve change.

### Foreign Policy of Iran in the Pezeshkian Era

As soon as he became President, Massoud Pezeshkian shared his messages to the international community with an article he published in Tehran Times. Emphasizing that Iran's foreign policy is based on the principles of "honor, wisdom and prudence," Pezeshkian stated that they will pursue a policy of balancing relations with all countries in line with national interests, economic development, security, regional and global peace requirements. Expressing that they will prioritize strengthening relations with neighboring countries, Pezeshkian emphasized that he advocates building a "strong region" and that regional countries should not waste their resources on destructive competitions.<sup>10</sup> It is important for Pezeshkian to take a comprehensive stance, especially in terms of relations with neighbors, and to point to regional partnership. Aware that the balance of power has changed drastically in the 21st century, Pezeshkian has

---

<sup>9</sup> Şen, "İran'da Cumhurbaşkanı Pezeşkiyan Dönemi".

<sup>10</sup> "İran Basınında Öne Çıkanlar (13-19 Temmuz)", İRAM Center | İran Araştırmaları Merkezi,

22.07.2024, (Online)

<https://www.iramcenter.org/iran-basininda-one-cikanlar-13-19-temmuz-2521>, 03.03.2025.

determined that getting along with neighboring countries will play a critical role for Iran in the new balances that will emerge. It can be said that the image of an Iran getting along with its neighbors will be one of the most critical changes that the Pezeshkian era's foreign policy will bring.

Pezeshkian, who has continued the harsh tone used throughout the history of the Islamic Republic of Iran in relations with Israel, called on neighboring Arab countries to cooperate to achieve a permanent ceasefire in Gaza. Pezeshkian rejected the accusations of anti-Semitism leveled against Iran due to its principled stance on the Palestinian issue, and argued that these accusations were an insult to Iran's culture, beliefs and fundamental values.<sup>11</sup> The Haniyeh assassination and mutual attacks have caused tension between Iran and Israel. Pezeshkian continues to make anti-Israeli statements at every opportunity. In his speech at the 79th United Nations General Assembly, the President stated, "The international community must immediately stop the violence and a permanent ceasefire must be established as soon as possible; Israel's brutality in Lebanon must be stopped before it sets the region and the world on fire." He then stated that Iran has not started any war and has not occupied any nation's land, and that Iran's attacks are only for the purpose of retaliation.<sup>12</sup> It is certain that Pezeshkian will continue to pursue an anti-Israeli policy.

<sup>11</sup> "İran Basınında Öne Çıkanlar (13-19 Temmuz)".

<sup>12</sup> "Pezeşkiyan: Siyonist rejim vahşeti bir an önce durdurulmalı", **İslam Cumhuriyeti Haber Ajansı (IRNA)**, IRNA Türkçe, 25.09.2024, (Online) <https://tr.irna.ir/news/85606972/Pezeşkiyan-Siyonist-rejim-vahşeti-bir-an-önce-durdurulmalı>, 03.03.2025.

<sup>13</sup> "İran Basınında Öne Çıkanlar (13-19 Temmuz)".

<sup>14</sup> "Pezeşkiyan: Amerika seçimlerini kimin kazandığı bizim için önemli değil", **İslam Cumhuriyeti Haber**

In relations with the US, Pezeshkian has frequently stated that Iran will not bow to pressure. Criticizing the damage done to the Iranian economy by the US withdrawal from the nuclear deal in 2018 and the imposition of sanctions, Pezeshkian stated that the US policy of provoking regional countries against each other has failed.<sup>13</sup> Stating that it does not matter who wins the US presidential election, the President said, "Our country and our order are based on an honorable and great nation and its own internal power."<sup>14</sup> It is possible to say that tensions continue in Iran's relations with the US. Pezeshkian, who is disturbed by the US hegemony in the region and the rest of the world, has chosen the path of rapprochement with Russia. Pezeshkian's policies, which aim to resolve US sanctions against Iran through a partnership with Russia, are also important in terms of the course of relations between the US and Russia.

Iran, which has joined BRICS as a permanent member, aims to develop partnerships, especially with Russia, in foreign policy. Masoud Pezeshkian is also moving in this direction. In his statement following the BRICS leaders' summit held in Russia, Pezeshkian stated that a decision was made to establish a new fund against the unilateral policies of the US in the current International Monetary Fund (IMF), and that the US's sanctions policies would be rendered ineffective in this way.<sup>15</sup> Russian President Putin stated that

**Ajansı (IRNA)**, IRNA Türkçe, 07.11.2024, (Online) <https://tr.irna.ir/news/85652825/Pezeşkiyan-Amerika-seçimlerini-kimin-kazandığı-bizim-için-önemli>, 03.03.2025.

<sup>15</sup> "Pezeşkiyan: BRICS Zirvesi'nin kazanımları uygulandığında ABD ve müttefiklerinin komploları etkisiz hale gelecek", **İslam Cumhuriyeti Haber Ajansı (IRNA)**, IRNA Türkçe, 25.10.2024, (Online) <https://tr.irna.ir/news/85638641/Pezeşkiyan->

Russia and Iran's approaches to international and regional issues are the same or similar, and said, "We aim to create a fair and multipolar world order and preserve the key role of the United Nations."<sup>16</sup> In a context where BRICS is rising and Russia needs partnerships, this rapprochement between Iran and Russia is an important political step for both the Middle East and the rest of the world. Both countries aim to break US sanctions and end US hegemony in the international arena through the partnerships they have developed. Pezeshkian's active foreign policy after taking office is aimed at ending Iran's isolation in the international arena.

### Iran-Türkiye Relations

The fact that there are around 30 million Turks or Azeris in Iran makes the people in Iran even more important for Türkiye. However, it should be noted that the vast majority of Turks in Iran see their identity under the umbrella of "Iranianness" and the Turks living in the region see themselves as the owners of the Islamic Revolution. However, Iran still occasionally implements efforts to assimilate Turks, like other minorities, under the "Iranization" policy. Therefore, there are groups among the Turks who are disturbed by the current regime. Since they are the largest minority group, the way Turks participate in politics is an important topic for the new administration. Pezeshkian's use of the

slogan "I am a Turk and I am proud of it" in his election campaign also makes the new administration even more important for the Turks. However, when Pezeshkian says "I am a Turk", he does not reject being Iranian. Because accepting Turkishness in Iran does not mean rejecting Iranianness. Pezeshkian is not a "Turkist" as is thought, and if he were, it is certain that his candidacy for the Presidency would not have been approved by the system. Nevertheless, it is clear that his approach to Turkishness and the Turkish language is an important development for the Turkish people in the region.

Mesud Pezeshkian has made friendly statements about Türkiye in many different places. Speaking at a press conference he held in September 2024, Pezeshkian said the following about Türkiye: "Türkiye is our friend, our brother country, we can also say that we are relatives. Our faith and culture are intertwined and it is our desire and wish to make a joint investment with Türkiye."<sup>17</sup> On the other hand, President Erdoğan stated in his meeting with Pezeshkian that the historical and cultural ties between Türkiye and Iran have always had a positive impact on the relations between the two countries, that in the new period, cooperation opportunities that are in line with the interests of the two countries will be evaluated, and that he believes that relations will be developed and advanced in every field.<sup>18</sup>

---

BRICS-Zirvesi-nin-kazanımları-uygulandığında-ABD, 03.03.2025.

<sup>16</sup> "Pezeshkian: Umuyoruz ki Rusya'nın yardımıyla ABD'nin hegemonyasını sona erdireceğiz", **İslam Cumhuriyeti Haber Ajansı (IRNA)**, IRNA Türkçe, 23.10.2024, (Online)

<https://tr.irna.ir/news/85637397/Pezeşkiyan-Umuyoruz-ki-Rusya-nın-yardımiyla-ABD-nin-hegemonyasını>, 03.03.2025.

<sup>17</sup> "Pezeshkian: Mutlaka Türkiye'ye gideceğim", **İslam Cumhuriyeti Haber Ajansı (IRNA)**, IRNA

Türkçe, 16.09.2024, (Online)

<https://tr.irna.ir/news/85598600/Pezeşkiyan-Mutlaka-Türkiye-ye-gideceğim>, 26.02.2025.

<sup>18</sup> "Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan'ın, İran Cumhurbaşkanı Pezeşkiyan'ı kabulüne dair açıklama", **T.C. İletişim Başkanlığı**, 23.09.2024, (Online)

<https://www.iletisim.gov.tr/turkce/haberler/detay/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-iran-cumhurbaskani-mesut-pezeskiyan-ile-gorustu/>, 27.02.2025.



Recently, the Turkish idioms included in Masoud Pezeshkian's statements were interesting. Pezeshkian, who read the poem "Greetings to Haydar Baba" in Azerbaijani Turkish by the famous Turkish poet Muhammed Hüseyin Behçet Tabrizi, known as Shahriar, at the closing ceremony of Tabriz Culture Week, was warned by an official while he was reading the poem. Upon this, the Iranian President laughed and said, "No problem, there will be no problem in reading two Turkish poems" and was applauded by the audience.<sup>19</sup> While being disturbed by even a short poem reveals the regime's clear stance on minorities, Pezeshkian's continuing to read the poem is a behavior that shows the area he has against the regime. On the other hand, Pezeshkian stated in his speech regarding the possibility of nuclear negotiations with the US that negotiations should be within the framework of respect, and said the following: "We have a poem in Turkish. We got used to it this way. It says; 'Do not cross the treacherous bridge, let the flood take you. Do not lie in the shadow of a fox, let the lion eat you.' In other words, honor and freedom. Even if a person sleeps in the shadow of a fox, even if the flood takes a person away, you cannot stand in the shadow of the treacherous."<sup>20</sup> As can be seen, Pezeshkiyan does not hesitate to show his Turkish identity. It is possible to conclude that Pezeshkiyan, who recites Turkish couplets and poems one after another,

aims to expand his area of power by gaining the support of Turks who are disturbed by the regime with his behavior.

It is possible to say that the two countries, which have similar attitudes especially towards Israel's genocide, have become even closer in this process. In the joint press conference attended by Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan and his Iranian counterpart Abbas Arakçi, Hakan Fidan said, "Netanyahu is constantly opening new fronts in the region and trying to drag Iran into this war. He is threatening to strike Iran's oil and nuclear facilities. Israel's aggressive stance is forcing Iran to take steps in legitimate defense." and drew attention to Israel's provocative moves in the Israel-Iran conflict. Fidan stated that bilateral relations between Türkiye and Iran will be developed in every sense and that efforts to increase cooperation on regional issues will continue. It was emphasized at the meeting that recent developments have further increased the importance of this cooperation.<sup>21</sup> It is seen that the common discourses and similar policies pursued in foreign policy between the two countries have continued to increase during the Pezeshkian period. Türkiye's rapprochement with BRICS in particular will further develop relations with Iran. The possible common policies that these two countries, which already have good relations with Russia, will implement in foreign policy are very

<sup>19</sup> Ahmet Dursun, "İran Cumhurbaşkanı Pezeşkiyan, Türkçe şiir okurken bir yetkili tarafından uyarıldı", **AA**, 16.02.2025, (Online) <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/dunya/iran-cumhurbaşkanı-pezeskiyan-turkce-siir-okurken-bir-yetkili-tarafından-uyarıldı/3484055>, 27.02.2025.

<sup>20</sup> Ahmet Dursun, "İran Cumhurbaşkanı Pezeşkiyan, ABD'nin baskılarına Türkçe deyişle cevap verdi", **AA**, 21.02.2025, (Online) <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/dunya/iran-cumhurbaşkanı-pezeskiyan-abd-nin-baskılarına-türkçe-deyişle-cevap-verdi>

cumhurbaşkanı-pezeskiyan-abdnin-baskılarına-turkce-deyişle-cevap-verdi/3488637, 27.02.2025.

<sup>21</sup> "Dışişleri Bakanı Sayın Hakan Fidan'ın İran Dışişleri Bakanı Abbas Arakçi ile Ortak Basın Toplantısı, 19 Ekim 2024 / T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı", **Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Dışişleri Bakanlığı**, 19.10.2024, (Online) <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/disisleri-bakani-sayin-hakan-fidan-in-iran-disisleri-bakani-abbas-arakci-ile-ortak-basin-toplantisi-19-10-2024.tr.mfa>, 03.03.2025.

important in terms of the dynamics of the region.

### Conclusion

The Pezeshkian era in Iran continued as chaotic as it had begun. From the moment Massoud Pezeshkian came to power, he tried to re-establish the ties between the people and the regime that were about to be broken in domestic politics. However, the shadow of Khamenei and the Ulema on him was a challenging element for Pezeshkian. Aware of the people's desire for change, Khamenei allowed a reformist candidate to run for president, but he was careful to ensure that the candidate he allowed was someone loyal to him. It is possible to say that Pezeshkian followed a successful policy in this regard. Aware that a harsh wind of change is not possible in this conjuncture, Pezeshkian intends to carry out a change in a way that will not disturb the religious administration. This balance that Pezeshkian has to establish between the people and the religious administration will be decisive in whether the change will take place or the same order will continue.

In foreign policy, the new administration has had to struggle with many problems and has followed a more outward-looking policy compared to previous administrations in Iran. Pezeshkian, who continued similar discourses in relations with Israel and the US, especially struggled to eliminate the crises between Israel and Iran. Developing partnerships with Russia in the face of US sanctions, Pezeshkian aimed to stand against US hegemony with the economic and political arrangements promised by the BRICS formation. On the other hand, the new President, who also attaches importance to developing relations with neighbors, has frequently

emphasized unity in relations with Türkiye in foreign policy. Expressing his pride in his Turkish identity, Pezeshkian did not refrain from using Turkish verses in various speeches, even if he received backlash. Pezeshkian is aware that change is not possible without the Azeri-Turks minority and aims to develop relations with this minority in this direction.

### References

Caner, Mustafa: "İran'ın Pezeşkiyan Açılımı", **SETA**, 31.08.2024, (Online) <https://www.setav.org/yorum/iranin-pezeskiyan-acilimi>, 17.02.2025.

"Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan'ın, İran Cumhurbaşkanı Pezeşkiyan'ı kabulüne dair açıklama", **T.C. İletişim Başkanlığı**, 23.09.2024, (Online) <https://www.iletisim.gov.tr/turkce/haberler/detay/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-iran-cumhurbaskani-mesut-pezeskiyan-ile-gorustu/>, 27.02.2025.

"Dışişleri Bakanı Sayın Hakan Fidan'ın İran Dışişleri Bakanı Abbas Arakçi ile Ortak Basın Toplantısı, 19 Ekim 2024 / T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı", **Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Dışişleri Bakanlığı**, 19.10.2024, (Online) <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/disisleri-bakani-sayin-hakan-fidan-in-iran-disisleri-bakani-abbas-arakci-ile-ortak-basin-toplantisi-19-10-2024.tr.mfa>, 03.03.2025.

Dursun, Ahmet: "İran Cumhurbaşkanı Pezeşkiyan, ABD'nin baskılarına Türkçe deyişle cevap verdi", **AA**, 21.02.2025, (Online) <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/dunya/iran-cumhurbaskani-pezeskiyan-abdnin-baskilarina-turkce-deyisle-cevap-verdi/3488637>, 27.02.2025.

— — —: "İran Cumhurbaşkanı Pezeşkiyan, Türkçe şiir okurken bir yetkili tarafından uyarıldı", **AA**, 16.02.2025, (Online) <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/dunya/iran-cumhurbaskani-pezeskiyan-turkce-siir-okurken-bir-yetkili-tarafindan-uyarildi/3484055>, 27.02.2025.

“İran Basınında Öne Çıkanlar (13-19 Temmuz)”, **İRAM Center | İran Araştırmaları Merkezi**, 22.07.2024, (Online) <https://www.iramcenter.org/iran-basininda-one-cikanlar-13-19-temmuz-2521>, 03.03.2025.

“İran Basınında Öne Çıkanlar (22-27 Haziran)”, **İRAM Center | İran Araştırmaları Merkezi**, 02.07.2024, (Online) <https://www.iramcenter.org/iran-basininda-one-cikanlar-22-27-haziran-2509>, 17.02.2025.

“İran Basınında Öne Çıkanlar (25-30 Mayıs)”, **İRAM Center | İran Araştırmaları Merkezi**, 03.06.2024, (Online) <https://www.iramcenter.org/iran-basininda-one-cikanlar-25-30-mayis-2496>, 17.02.2025.

“İran Basınında Öne Çıkanlar (29 Haziran 2024 – 5 Temmuz 2024)”, **İRAM Center | İran Araştırmaları Merkezi**, 08.07.2024, (Online) <https://www.iramcenter.org/iran-basininda-one-cikanlar-29-haziran-2024-5-temmuz-2024-2514>, 17.02.2025.

“İran Cumhurbaşkanı Pezeşkiyan: Ahlak polisi kadınları artık ‘rahatsız etmeyecek’”, **BBC News Türkçe**, 17.09.2024, (Online) <https://www.bbc.com/turkce/articles/c6255penp2no>, 26.02.2025.

“İran’ın yeni Cumhurbaşkanı Mesud Pezeşkiyan kimdir?”, **euronews**, 06.07.2024, (Online) <https://tr.euronews.com/2024/07/06/iranin-yeni-cumhurbaskani-mesud-pezeskiyan-kimdir>, 26.02.2025.

“Pezeşkiyan: Amerika seçimlerini kimin kazandığı bizim için önemli değil”, **İslam Cumhuriyeti Haber Ajansı (IRNA)**, IRNA Türkçe, 07.11.2024, (Online) <https://tr.irna.ir/news/85652825/Pezeşkiyan-Amerika-seçimlerini-kimin-kazandığı-bizim-için-önemli>, 03.03.2025.

“Pezeşkiyan: BRICS Zirvesi’nin kazanımları uygulandığında ABD ve müttefiklerinin komploları etkisiz hale gelecek”, **İslam Cumhuriyeti Haber Ajansı (IRNA)**, IRNA Türkçe, 25.10.2024, (Online) <https://tr.irna.ir/news/85638641/Pezeşkiyan-BRICS-Zirvesi-nin-kazanımları-uygulandığında-ABD>, 03.03.2025.

“Pezeşkiyan: Mutlaka Türkiye’ye gideceğim”, **İslam Cumhuriyeti Haber Ajansı (IRNA)**, IRNA Türkçe, 16.09.2024, (Online) <https://tr.irna.ir/news/85598600/Pezeşkiyan-Mutlaka-Türkiye-ye-gideceğim>, 26.02.2025.

“Pezeşkiyan: Siyonist rejim vahşeti bir an önce durdurulmalı”, **İslam Cumhuriyeti Haber Ajansı (IRNA)**, IRNA Türkçe, 25.09.2024, (Online) <https://tr.irna.ir/news/85606972/Pezeşkiyan-Siyonist-rejim-vahşeti-bir-an-önce-durdurulmalı>, 03.03.2025.

“Pezeşkiyan: Umuyoruz ki Rusya’nın yardımıyla ABD’nin hegemonyasını sona erdireceğiz”, **İslam Cumhuriyeti Haber Ajansı (IRNA)**, IRNA Türkçe, 23.10.2024, (Online) <https://tr.irna.ir/news/85637397/Pezeşkiyan-Umuyoruz-ki-Rusya-nın-yardımıyla-ABD-nin-hegemonyasını>, 03.03.2025.

Şen, Gülriç: “İran’da Cumhurbaşkanı Pezeşkiyan Dönemi: Beklentiler, Zorluklar, İhtimaller”, **Panorama**, 19.07.2024, (Online) <https://www.uikpanorama.com/blog/2024/07/19/iran-secimler-gs/>, 17.02.2025.



DİPLOMATİK İLİŞKİLER ve POLİTİK ARAŞTIRMALAR MERKEZİ  
CENTER for DIPLOMATIC AFFAIRS and POLITICAL STUDIES

+90 216 310 30 40 info@dipam.org

+90 216 310 30 50 www.dipam.org

Merdivenköy Mah. Nur Sok. Business İstanbul  
A Blok Kat:12 No:115, Kadıköy/İstanbul

### ABOUT THE AUTHOR

**Muhammed Sadi Korkutata** graduated from Istanbul University, Department of Political Science and International Relations (English) in 2023. Since 2023, he has been continuing his master's degree in the same field at Istanbul University and continues his work on his thesis titled "The Transformation of Reform Movements in Iran: The Case of Ali Shariati".

Korkutata is currently continuing his internship program at DİPAM. Korkutata's research interests include Iran, Europe and regional security issues.