

# INTERPRETING THE US-CHINA RIVALRY THROUGH TRADE WARS AND RARE EARTH ELEMENTS

March 2025 No: 54



# INTERPRETING THE US-CHINA RIVALRY THROUGH TRADE WARS AND RARE EARTH ELEMENTS

As the 21st century marks a period where the global power dynamics are reshaping, US-China relations stand as one of the most significant geopolitical and economic rivalries of the era. The hegemonic dominance that the United States has maintained since World War II has been shaken in recent years due to various economic, political, and military factors. Meanwhile, China has increasingly positioned itself as a significant player in the international system, driven by its economic growth, technological advancements, and expanding influence in global trade. As a result, strategic competition between these two powers has become inevitable.

During Donald Trump's first presidency, US-China relations witnessed intense confrontation, with trade wars and protectionist policies in foreign trade becoming defining aspects of global politics. However, the competition between the US and China is not limited to the economic and technological domains; critical raw materials and the mining sector have emerged as new and significant dimensions of this struggle. Rare earth elements and other critical minerals, now among the world's most valuable resources, play a crucial role in the production of advanced technologies. These minerals are essential in various strategic sectors, ranging from semiconductors and batteries to renewable energy technologies and the defense industry. One of the key factors supporting China's economic growth has been its dominance over raw material supply chains, particularly in rare earth elements. Recognizing its strategic vulnerability due to its dependence on China for these indispensable minerals—especially for chip production and the defense sector—the United States has sought alternative sources in the mining industry to counter China's monopoly over critical raw materials. In this context, countries like Ukraine and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have emerged as potential partners in rare earth element supply, prompting new initiatives to utilize these resources.

Amid this global competition, Türkiye holds a significant position. With its rich mineral resources and strategic importance, Türkiye has the potential to become a key player in the global mining race. The country's current mining policies and future strategic initiatives will shape its role in this great power struggle. This article aims to analyze the US-China rivalry, particularly in the context of trade wars, evaluate the strategic importance of rare earth elements as a crucial issue for the future, and examine Türkiye's place within this ongoing process.

## Trade Wars During the Trump Administrations

Although US-China relations in the post-Cold War era were shaped by economic cooperation and interdependence, the competitive aspect has increasingly come to the forefront since the early 21st century. China's rapid economic growth, its central position in global supply chains, and its rise in the technology sector have been perceived as a strategic threat by the U.S. With Donald Trump's inauguration as US President in 2017, the National Security Strategy (NSS) document published that same year emphasized that "great power

competition has returned.”<sup>1</sup> This was the first official document in which China was explicitly identified as a competitor and threat in the hegemonic rivalry.<sup>2</sup> Trump frequently criticized the US’s significant trade deficit with China, accusing China of “unfair trade practices.”

China has gained significant profits from trade with the US. The US trade deficit with China, which was \$2.7 billion in 1987, had ballooned to \$318 billion in 2013, \$344 billion in 2014, \$367 billion in 2015, and \$346 billion in 2016.<sup>3</sup> Based on these figures, Trump implemented a series of tariff policies during his first term to curb the trade deficit, leading to significant shifts in international trade balances.

The trade war between the US and China began in 2018 when the Trump administration imposed a 25% tariff on \$50 billion worth of Chinese imports, citing unfair trade practices. In response, China announced tariffs on an equivalent amount of US goods. As tensions escalated, Trump retaliated against China’s countermeasures by threatening additional tariffs on \$200 billion worth of imports. China responded with tariffs on \$60 billion worth of US goods. In 2019,

Trump increased tariffs on \$200 billion worth of Chinese products to 25% and later announced a 10% tariff on an additional \$300 billion worth of imports. China, in turn, imposed new tariffs on \$75 billion worth of US goods.<sup>4</sup>

The period between 2018 and 2019, a real trade war period, impacted approximately \$450 billion worth of trade flows.<sup>5</sup> In January 2020, the US and China signed the “Phase One Agreement,” partially halting the trade war, although tariffs remained in effect.<sup>6</sup> The US trade deficit with China, which stood at \$375 billion in 2017, fluctuated in subsequent years—rising to \$418 billion in 2018, declining to \$342 billion in 2019, and further decreasing to \$307 billion in 2020.<sup>7</sup>

With Joe Biden assuming office in 2021, some changes occurred in US-China relations, but the Biden administration largely maintained Trump-era tariffs. The US trade deficit with China remained volatile, reaching \$352 billion in 2021, rising to \$382 billion in 2022, before falling to \$279 billion in 2023 and slightly increasing to \$295 billion in 2024.

<sup>1</sup> The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, December 2017, p.27.

<sup>2</sup> Elif Gürdal, “ABD Ulusal Güvenlik Strateji Belgelerinde Çin’in Yeri Ve Hegemonik Düzen,” *Güvenlik Çalışmaları Dergisi* 23, no. 2 (December 20, 2021): 200–219, <https://doi.org/10.54627/gcd.947822>

<sup>3</sup> United States Census Bureau, *Foreign Trade Balance with China*, (n.d.). <https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html>

<sup>4</sup> Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE). 2018. *Trump’s Trade War Timeline: An Up-to-Date Guide*. <https://www.piie.com/blogs/trade-and-investment-policy-watch/2018/trumps-trade-war-timeline-date-guide>

<sup>5</sup> Pablo Fajgelbaum et al., “The US-China Trade War and Global Reallocations,” *American Economic Review Insights* 6, no. 2 (May 31, 2024): 295–312, <https://doi.org/10.1257/aeri.20230094>

<sup>6</sup> Pablo D. Fajgelbaum and Amit K. Khandelwal, “The Economic Impacts of the US–China Trade War,” *Annual Review of Economics* 14, no. 1 (April 28, 2022): 205–28, <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-051420-110410>

<sup>7</sup> United States Census Bureau, *Foreign Trade Balance with China*, (n.d.). <https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html>

Following Donald Trump's re-election in 2024, the "Trade and Tariffs Based on Reciprocity"<sup>8</sup> memorandum was signed. This document stated that low US tariffs were a primary cause of the US's annual goods trade deficit. It also stated that the "Fair and Reciprocal Plan" will be introduced to reduce the United States' large trade deficit and address injustices in trade. As part of this plan, the equivalent of reciprocal tariffs will be determined for each trading partner to prevent this undesirable situation. Accordingly, the first set of tariffs was announced on February 1, 2025, set to take effect on February 4. In this regard, it has been stated that additional tariffs will be imposed on the United States' three largest trading partners, Canada, Mexico and China, citing their failures in stopping illegal immigration and the flow of fentanyl. Thus, a 25% tariff was imposed on imports from Canada and Mexico, and a 10% tariff on imports from China.<sup>9</sup>

On February 13, Donald Trump signed a Presidential Memorandum titled "Fair and Reciprocal Plan" to restore fairness in trade relations and counter non-reciprocal trade arrangements.<sup>10</sup> The plan aims to boost America's competitiveness by imposing higher tariffs on trade partners such as

Brazil, India, and the European Union (EU). Unlike his first term, the tariffs imposed in this period are not only concentrated on China but are also being applied to the allies of the U.S.

In response, on February 4, China announced that starting March 10, it would impose a 15% tariff on US coal and liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports, along with 10-15% additional tariffs on American agricultural products such as corn, beef, pork, dairy, and soybeans.<sup>11</sup> On March 4, Trump raised tariffs on all Chinese imports from 10% to 20%.<sup>12</sup> In response, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared that China would "fight to the end in a tariff war, trade war or any other war with the US."<sup>13</sup> On March 12, the US removed exemptions on steel imports and increased tariffs from 10% to 25% across all countries.

Compared to the aggressive trade wars of Trump's first term, his second-term policies appear to be more controlled and strategic for both parties. While China continues to retaliate against tariffs, it is implementing relatively moderate countermeasures to prevent further escalation and does not entirely rule out the possibility of a new agreement similar to the Phase One

---

<sup>8</sup> The White House, *Reciprocal Trade and Tariffs*, February 2, 2025.

<https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/2025/02/reciprocal-trade-and-tariffs/>

<sup>9</sup> The White House, *Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Imposes Tariffs on Imports from Canada, Mexico, and China*, February 1, 2025.

<https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/02/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-imposes-tariffs-on-imports-from-canada-mexico-and-china/>

<sup>10</sup> The White House, "Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Announces 'Fair and Reciprocal Plan' on Trade." February 13, 2025.

<https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/02/fact-sheet-president-donald-j->

<trump-announces-fair-and-reciprocal-plan-on-trade/>

<sup>11</sup> CNBC, *China Rejects Additional US Tariffs, Vows to Take Countermeasures*, March 4, 2025.

<https://www.cnbc.com/2025/03/04/china-rejects-additional-us-tariffs-vows-to-take-countermeasures.html>

<sup>12</sup> Reuters, *Trade Wars Erupt: Trump Hits Canada, Mexico, China with Steep Tariffs*, March 4, 2025.

<https://www.reuters.com/world/trade-wars-erupt-trump-hits-canada-mexico-china-with-steep-tariffs-2025-03-04/>

<sup>13</sup> The Guardian, *China and Donald Trump's US Tariffs Trade War*, March 6, 2025.

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/mar/06/china-donald-trump-us-tariffs-trade-war>

Agreement.<sup>14</sup> However, Beijing has also made it clear that it will respond firmly if confronted with even higher tariffs.

During the “Two Sessions” meeting, a crucial annual political event in China where government policies, economic targets, and foreign policies are determined, officials announced new domestic policies aimed at mitigating the adverse effects of tariffs and boosting domestic consumption. Despite maintaining last year’s 5% growth target, Chinese policymakers acknowledged the challenges ahead, emphasizing the need for a stable and determined approach to achieving economic goals.<sup>15</sup>

The future trajectory of US-China trade wars remains uncertain, but excessive reliance on tariffs could lead to detrimental consequences. A new competitive front centered around rare earth elements—strategically crucial for various industries—could give China a significant advantage over the US in this prolonged economic rivalry.

### Critical Minerals and Rare Earth Elements

Throughout history, the pursuit of valuable minerals has always been present. Throughout history, the desire to acquire precious metals has been a constant pursuit. Alongside valuable commercial goods such as silk and spices, the quest for gold and other precious metals has driven

the expansion of colonialism. In the modern era, however, oil and natural gas have emerged as the most significant examples of geopolitical competition over natural resources.

Rare earth elements (REE), often described as the “oil of the 21st century,”<sup>16</sup> consist of 17 distinct elements that are, counter to their name, not particularly rare. They are designated as “rare” due to the challenges associated with locating them in their purest form, as well as the technical difficulties inherent in their processing. These elements are crucial in global competition, shaping a new dimension of inter-state rivalry. Due to their high conductivity, magnetic properties, and heat resistance, they are essential for high-tech products such as smartphones, microchips, electric vehicles, batteries, nuclear reactors, and even in defense and space technology, including the production of nuclear reactors and F-35 fighter jets. Additionally, REE plays a pivotal role in the transition to green energy, particularly in wind turbines, electric vehicles, and energy storage systems, contributing to the development of sustainable energy solutions.

According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), global demand for magnet-based REE nearly doubled between 2015 and 2023, reaching 93,000 tons, primarily due to the rise in electric vehicle sales and wind turbine installations.<sup>17</sup> The OECD

---

<sup>14</sup> Al Jazeera, *Why China Isn't as Worried About Trump's Trade War as in 2018*, March 11, 2025. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/3/11/why-china-isnt-as-worried-about-trumps-trade-war-as-in-2018>

<sup>15</sup> CNN, *China's Economic Strategy: Key Takeaways*, March 10, 2025. <https://edition.cnn.com/2025/03/10/business/two-sessions-china-key-takeaways-intl-hnk>

<sup>16</sup> Ariel Cohen, *China's Journey to the Center of the Earth*, Forbes, 2021.

<https://www.forbes.com/sites/arielcohen/2021/06/02/chinas-journey-to-the-center-of-the-earth/>

<sup>17</sup> International Energy Agency, *Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2024*, 2024.

<https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/ee01701d-1d5c-4ba8-9df6-abeac9de99a/GlobalCriticalMineralsOutlook2024.pdf#page=176.12>

projects that the current demand for these resources, which stands at 79 billion tons, will exceed 167 billion tons by the year 2060.<sup>18</sup>

Much like OPEC's control over oil, China has established a near-monopoly over REE<sup>19</sup>, accounting for approximately 70% of global extraction, 90% of processing, and much of the supply chain. By investing heavily in Latin America, Africa, and Central Asia, China has solidified its dominance. It controls the world's largest REE reserves, including the 800-million-ton Bayan Obo deposit in Inner Mongolia and the recently discovered 1.15-million-ton reserve in Yunnan. Additionally, China has strengthened its strategic position by securing stakes in Chile and Peru, which hold 55% of global copper reserves<sup>20</sup>, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, which possesses over 60% of the world's cobalt reserves.

China's dominance stems from early entry into the sector, state-backed investments, and low labor costs.<sup>21</sup> Since the 2000s, it has reinforced its control by keeping production costs low, benefiting from lax environmental regulations, and leveraging high-tech processing facilities, making it difficult for other nations to compete.

---

<sup>18</sup> European Union Publications Office, *Critical Raw Materials Act: Ensuring Secure and Sustainable Supply Chains for Europe*, 2023. <https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/57318397-fdd4-11ed-a05c-01aa75ed71a1>

<sup>19</sup> Spencer Bowlus, *How is the Chinese Domination of the Supply Chain of Rare Earth Elements Affecting the Relative Power of China Compared to the US?* (Doctoral dissertation, Johns Hopkins University, 2022), p.33.

<sup>20</sup> Ariel Cohen, *China's Journey to the Center of the Earth*, Forbes, 2021. <https://www.forbes.com/sites/arielcohen/2021/06/02/chinas-journey-to-the-center-of-the-earth/>

The first major diplomatic crisis over REE<sup>22</sup> occurred in 2010 between China and Japan. Since then, China has temporarily halted exports, showcasing its ability to leverage these resources as a geopolitical tool.

The United States remains significantly behind China in the race for critical minerals and REE. In the second half of the 20th century, the Mountain Pass mines in California were among the world's largest producers of rare earth elements. However, due to its inability to compete with China's low-cost production and strict environmental regulations, the mine was shut down in 2002.

The first concrete steps in this area were taken through Donald Trump's 2017 executive order titled "*A Federal Strategy to Ensure Secure and Reliable Supplies of Critical Minerals.*" This order emphasized that REEs were crucial for maintaining U.S. economic and military strength but that dependency on foreign sources posed a strategic vulnerability. It directed the Department of the Interior to conduct a review to identify minerals critical to the U.S.<sup>23</sup> Based on the report, 35 critical minerals were identified, with the U.S. importing more than half of its annual consumption for 31 of them and being

<sup>21</sup> Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, *China's Rare Earths Dominance and Policy Responses*, 2023. <https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/CE7-Chinas-rare-earths-dominance-and-policy-responses.pdf>

<sup>22</sup> Nida Günsan, "Nadir Toprak Elementlerinin Ekonomik-Politik Etkisi," *Aksaray Üniversitesi İktisadi Ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi*, November 11, 2024, <https://doi.org/10.52791/aksarayiibd.1521244>

<sup>23</sup> Federal Register, *A Federal Strategy to Ensure Secure and Reliable Supplies of Critical Minerals*, 2017. <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2017-12-26/pdf/2017-27899.pdf>

entirely dependent on imports for 14. Following this, President Trump proclaimed a national emergency, emphasizing the need to support domestic mineral projects and to establish alternative supply chains.<sup>24</sup> Today, Mountain Pass, which accounts for about 14% of global rare earth production, was reopened in 2018.

Recognizing the significance of rare earth elements and other critical minerals, the Biden administration initiated the *Mineral Security Partnership* (MSP) in 2022 with the EU, Canada, Australia, and Japan to reduce China's global dominance over critical minerals and create a secure and sustainable supply chain for clean energy technologies.<sup>25</sup> In 2023, the U.S. and the EU signed the *EU-U.S. Critical Minerals Agreement*, aimed at strengthening international supply chains and facilitating trade.

Another key development was China's response to U.S. embargoes on advanced chips and chip manufacturing equipment that could be used in China's military and AI technologies. In 2023, China began taking stricter measures regarding the rare earth supply chain by imposing export license requirements on metals such as gallium and germanium, which play a critical role in semiconductor production, to increase U.S. and allied dependence on

China's semiconductor sector. Toward the end of Biden's term, as restrictions on semiconductor exports escalated, China retaliated by banning shipments of antimony, gallium, and germanium to the U.S. This marked the first time China specifically targeted the U.S. rather than applying blanket restrictions on all countries.<sup>26</sup> Thus, China has utilized its control over key resources as a means to exert economic and political influence over the United States.

After being re-elected as President of the United States, Donald Trump expressed interest in purchasing Greenland, later suggested making Canada the 51st state, and attempted to sign a mineral agreement with Ukraine. The U.S. strategy to counter China's dominance appears to be securing these elements from resource-rich regions such as Greenland, Canada, and Ukraine, processing them domestically, and reducing dependence on China. Indeed, during his March 4, 2025, Congressional address, Trump announced "historic" actions to significantly increase domestic production of critical minerals and REE. A week later, reports from two high-ranking U.S. officials revealed that Trump was planning to establish metal refinery facilities at Pentagon military bases as part of his strategy to boost domestic production and counter China's control over the sector.<sup>27</sup> On March 20, 2025, a

---

<sup>24</sup> The White House, *Executive Order on Addressing the Threat to the Domestic Supply Chain from Reliance on Critical Minerals from Foreign Adversaries*, 2020.

<https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-addressing-threat-domestic-supply-chain-reliance-critical-minerals-foreign-adversaries/>

<sup>25</sup> U.S. Department of State, "Minerals Security Partnership", <https://2021-2025.state.gov/minerals-security-partnership/#:~:text=Establishing%20the%20MSP,->

[MSP%20Launch%20%E2%80%93%20Canada&text=In%20June%202022%2C%20the%20Minerals,mining%20event%20in%20the%20world](https://www.csis.org/analysis/china-imposes-its-most-stringent-critical-minerals-export-restrictions-yet-amidst)

<sup>26</sup> CSIS, *China Imposes Its Most Stringent Critical Minerals Export Restrictions Yet Amidst Escalating U.S.-China Tech War*, December 4, 2024. <https://www.csis.org/analysis/china-imposes-its-most-stringent-critical-minerals-export-restrictions-yet-amidst>

<sup>27</sup> Reuters, *Trump Seeks Minerals Refining at Pentagon Bases to Boost US Output, Sources Say*, March 10, 2025.

presidential order was signed to invoke the “Defense Production Act” to increase domestic production of critical minerals and provide financial support.<sup>28</sup>

Another significant development in this area is the proposal made by the Democratic Republic of Congo to the U.S. and the EU for a mineral agreement in exchange for ending its conflict with the Rwanda-backed M23 rebel group. Although the country is extremely rich in strategic minerals such as cobalt, copper, and lithium, about 76% of Congo’s cobalt reserves are controlled by China. Even if negotiations between the U.S. and Congo have begun and a potential agreement is signed, it should be noted that this would not be sufficient to break China’s dominance. Additionally, a key challenge in this area is that it takes an average of 18 years for a mine to go from discovery to full-scale production.<sup>29</sup> This long process, requiring infrastructure investments, private sector collaboration, and government support, makes it difficult for the U.S. to achieve self-sufficiency in the short term and prolongs its dependence on foreign sources for critical minerals.

In conclusion, looking at all these developments, it is evident that U.S. foreign policy is increasingly shaped by the need to secure access to these critical resources and reduce dependency. While it is undeniable that the U.S. has fallen behind in this race and that China

maintains a relative advantage in this sector, the U.S. has begun taking concrete steps to address this challenge. However, in the near future, it seems unlikely that the U.S. will significantly challenge China’s dominance. In fact, the IEA projects that while China will maintain its leadership in mining through 2030, the U.S.’s global market share will remain at around 7%. The escalation of trade wars with China increases the likelihood that Beijing will incorporate these minerals into its sanctions framework, potentially putting the U.S. in a difficult position.

### Where does Türkiye Stand in All This?

In recent years, Türkiye has started to take various steps in the field of rare earth elements, to increase domestic production, reduce foreign dependence, and diversify supply sources. The rare earth element site discovered in Eskişehir in 2022, containing 694 million tons of reserves, has the capacity to make Türkiye an important player in this field, as it holds the second-largest reserves in the world after China’s Bayan Obo facilities.

Türkiye also proved its aim to make further progress in this field and its search for investment and technology by joining the Mineral Security Partnership in September 2024.<sup>30</sup> This step will also provide an alternative for member countries to develop supply chains and reduce their dependence on China. Shortly after, the

---

<https://www.reuters.com/world/us/trump-seeks-minerals-refining-pentagon-bases-boost-us-output-sources-say-2025-03-10/>

<sup>28</sup> The White House, “Immediate Measures to Increase American Mineral Production.” March 20, 2025. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/03/immediate-measures-to-increase-american-mineral-production/>

<sup>29</sup> The New York Times, *Ukraine Minerals Deal: What It Means for Global Supply Chains*, March 4,

2025.

<https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/04/opinion/ukraine-minerals-deal.html>

<sup>30</sup> Middle East Monitor, “Türkiye Joins Western-Led Crucial Minerals Group in Bid to Boost Role in Global Minerals Race,” *Middle East Monitor*, September 22, 2024, <https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20240922-turkiye-joins-western-led-crucial-minerals-group-in-bid-to-boost-role-in-global-minerals-race/>



Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources published the 2025 Türkiye Critical and Strategic Minerals Report<sup>31</sup>, which evaluates Türkiye's current mining capacity and future potential. This report shows that REE, listed under the "Important Critical Minerals" category, holds a priority position in Türkiye's mining policies.

Türkiye has the potential to stand out as a new and important actor in the global REE race. However, to gain a stronger influence in this sector, it must strengthen international cooperation in REE mining and processing, sign joint projects with technologically advanced countries, and increase domestic production capacities. In this regard, it is important to base energy and mining policies on a long-term strategy and to make flexible plans that can adapt to continuously developing technologies and market demands. This way, Türkiye can go beyond being merely a raw material supplier in critical mineral mining and become a hub for producing high-value-added products based on advanced technology.

## REFERENCES

Al Jazeera. "As Trump Talks Up Trade War with China, Fears Rise for Rare Earths Supply," January 9, 2025, <https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2025/1/9/as-trump-talks-up-trade-war-with-china-fears-rise-for-rare-earths-supply>

Al Jazeera. "Why China Isn't as Worried About Trump's Trade War as in 2018," March 11, 2025. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/3/11/why-china-isnt-as-worried-about-trumps-trade-war-as-in-2018>

<sup>31</sup> Enerji ve Tabii Kaynaklar Bakanlığı, "Türkiye Kritik ve Stratejik Madenler Raporu," <https://enerji.gov.tr/Media/Dizin/TKDB/tr/Belgeler>

Baskaran, Gracelin. 2025. "Opinion | How Trump Can Take a Page From China's Mineral Security Playbook." *The New York Times*, March 4, 2025. <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/04/opinion/ukraine-minerals-deal.html>

BBC Türkçe. "Trump Döneminde Çin ile Ticaret Savaşları," January 16, 2020, <https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-dunya-51129380>

Bowlus, Spencer. 2022. "How is the Chinese Domination of the Supply Chain of Rare Earth Elements Affecting the Relative Power of China Compared to the US?" (Doctoral dissertation, Johns Hopkins University, 2022)

CNBC. "China Rejects Additional US Tariffs, Vows to Take Countermeasures". March 4, 2025. <https://www.cnn.com/2025/03/04/china-rejects-additional-us-tariffs-vows-to-take-countermeasures.html>

CNN. "Trump's Steel and Aluminum Tariffs". March 12, 2025. [https://edition.cnn.com/2025/03/12/economy/trump-steel-aluminum-tariffs-hnk-intl/index.html?utm\\_source=business\\_ribbon](https://edition.cnn.com/2025/03/12/economy/trump-steel-aluminum-tariffs-hnk-intl/index.html?utm_source=business_ribbon)

Cohen, Ariel. "China's Journey to the Center of the Earth," *Forbes*, 2021. <https://www.forbes.com/sites/arielcohen/2021/06/02/chinas-journey-to-the-center-of-the-earth/>

CSIS. "China Imposes Its Most Stringent Critical Minerals Export Restrictions Yet Amidst Escalating U.S.-China Tech War". <https://www.csis.org/analysis/china-imposes-its-most-stringent-critical-minerals-export-restrictions-yet-amidst>

Enerji ve Tabii Kaynaklar Bakanlığı. "Türkiye Kritik ve Stratejik Madenler Raporu." [https://enerji.gov.tr/Media/Dizin/TKDB/tr/Belgeler/Tu%CC%88rkiye\\_Kritik\\_ve\\_Stratejik\\_Madenler\\_Raporu.pdf](https://enerji.gov.tr/Media/Dizin/TKDB/tr/Belgeler/Tu%CC%88rkiye_Kritik_ve_Stratejik_Madenler_Raporu.pdf)

[/Tu%CC%88rkiye Kritik ve Stratejik Madenler Raporu.pdf](https://enerji.gov.tr/Media/Dizin/TKDB/tr/Belgeler/Tu%CC%88rkiye_Kritik_ve_Stratejik_Madenler_Raporu.pdf)

Euronews. "Çin Devasa Nadir Toprak Element Rezervi Buldu: Türkiye'yle Rekabeti Nasıl Etkileyecek?" *Euronews*. January 18, 2025. <https://tr.euronews.com/2025/01/18/cin-devasa-nadir-toprak-element-rezervi-buldu-turkiyeye-rekabeti-nasil-etkileyecek>

European Union Publications Office. "Critical Raw Materials Act: Ensuring Secure and Sustainable Supply Chains for Europe." 2023. <https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/57318397-fdd4-11ed-a05c-01aa75ed71a1>

Federal Register. "A Federal Strategy to Ensure Secure and Reliable Supplies of Critical Minerals." 2017. <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2017-12-26/pdf/2017-27899.pdf>

Feinberg, Robert E. "Trump's Trade War: A Timeline, with 20 Key Dates." *Peterson Institute for International Economics*, March 12, 2025. <https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economics/2025/trumps-trade-war-timeline-20-date-guide>

Global Times. "Superlarge Rare-Earth Deposit Discovered in SW China's Yunnan, with Potential Resources Reaching 1.15 Million Tons." *Global Times*. January 17, 2025. <https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202501/1327071.shtml>

Gürdal, Elif. 2021. "ABD Ulusal Güvenlik Strateji Belgelerinde Çin'in Yeri Ve Hegemonik Düzen." *Güvenlik Çalışmaları Dergisi* 23 (2): 200–219. <https://doi.org/10.54627/gcd.947822>

International Energy Agency. "Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2024." 2024. <https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/ee01701d-1d5c-4ba8-9df6-abeeac9de99a/GlobalCriticalMineralsOutlook2024.pdf#page=176.12>

International Trade Administration. "Democratic Republic of Congo - Mining and Minerals." March 14, 2025, <https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/democratic-republic-congo-mining-and-minerals>

Kimball, Spencer. 2025. "Trump Signs Order to Increase Critical Mineral Production in the U.S."

CNBC. March 20, 2025. <https://www.cnn.com/2025/03/20/trump-signs-order-to-increase-critical-mineral-production-in-the-us.html>

Kriter Dergisi. "Türkiye'nin ABD-Çin Nadir Toprak Elementleri Güç Mücadelesindeki Stratejik Hamlesi." *Kriter Dergisi*. October 1, 2024. <https://kriterdergi.com/dis-politika/turkiyenin-abd-cin-nadir-toprak-elementleri-guc-mucadelesindeki-stratejik-hamlesi>

Middle East Monitor. "Türkiye Joins Western-Led Crucial Minerals Group in Bid to Boost Role in Global Minerals Race." *Middle East Monitor*. September 22, 2024. <https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20240922-turkiye-joins-western-led-crucial-minerals-group-in-bid-to-boost-role-in-global-minerals-race/>

MINING.COM. "Trump to Expand Critical Mineral Production Using Wartime Powers - MINING.COM." March 21, 2025. <https://www.mining.com/web/trump-to-expand-critical-mineral-production-using-wartime-powers/>

Mining Zimbabwe. "China Tightens Grip on Zimbabwe's Lithium Resources, Securing Key Mineral for Global Energy Transition." January 30, 2025, <https://miningzimbabwe.com/china-tightens-grip-on-zimbabwes-lithium-resources-securing-key-mineral-for-global-energy-transition/>

NBC News. "Chinese Delegate Says the Country Is Not Worried About Trump's Tariffs." erişim March 6, 2025, <https://www.nbcnews.com/video/chinese-delegate-says-the-country-is-not-worried-about-trump-s-tariffs-233654853606>

Nida Günsan. 2024. "Nadir Toprak Elementlerinin Ekonomik-Politik Etkisi." *Aksaray Üniversitesi İktisadi Ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi*. November 11, 2024, <https://doi.org/10.52791/aksarayıibd.1521244>

Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. "China's Rare Earths Dominance and Policy Responses." 2023. <https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/CE7-Chinas-rare-earths-dominance-and-policy-responses.pdf>

Pablo D. Fajgelbaum and Amit K. Khandelwal, "The Economic Impacts of the US–China Trade War," *Annual Review of Economics* 14, no. 1 (April 28, 2022): 205–28, <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-051420-110410>

Pablo Fajgelbaum et al., "The US-China Trade War and Global Reallocations," *American Economic Review Insights* 6, no. 2 (May 31, 2024): 295–312, <https://doi.org/10.1257/aeri.20230094>

Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE). 2018. "Trump's Trade War Timeline: An Up-to-Date Guide." <https://www.piie.com/blogs/trade-and-investment-policy-watch/2018/trumps-trade-war-timeline-date-guide>

"President Trump to Announce 'Historic' Actions to Massively Expand Critical Minerals and Rare Earths Production in the U.S. | NioCorp Developments Ltd." n.d. <https://www.niocorp.com/president-trump-to-announce-historic-actions-to-massively-expand-critical-minerals-and-rare-earths-production-in-the-u-s/>

Reuters. "Trade Wars Erupt: Trump Hits Canada, Mexico, China with Steep Tariffs." March 4, 2025. <https://www.reuters.com/world/trade-wars-erupt-trump-hits-canada-mexico-china-with-steep-tariffs-2025-03-04/>

Reuters. "Trump Seeks Minerals Refining at Pentagon Bases to Boost US Output, Sources Say." March 10, 2025. <https://www.reuters.com/world/us/trump-seeks-minerals-refining-pentagon-bases-boost-us-output-sources-say-2025-03-10/>

South China Morning Post. "China's Growing Zimbabwe Alliance Key to Its Bigger Plans in Southern Africa." February 28, 2025. <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3300583/chinas-growing-zimbabwe-alliance-key-its-bigger-plans-southern-africa?module=inline&pgtype=article>

South China Morning Post. "China Still Leads the Pack in Africa's Critical Minerals Race as U.S. Struggles to Keep Up." *South China Morning Post*, March 12, 2025.

<https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3301506/china-still-leads-pack-africas-critical-minerals-race-us-struggles-keep>

Tax Foundation, "Trump Tariffs and Trade War," March 7, 2025, <https://taxfoundation.org/research/all/federal/trump-tariffs-trade-war/>

The New York Times, "Ukraine Minerals Deal: What It Means for Global Supply Chains," March 4, 2025. <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/04/opinion/ukraine-minerals-deal.html>

The White House. 2025. "Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Announces 'Fair and Reciprocal Plan' on Trade." February 13, 2025. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/02/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-announces-fair-and-reciprocal-plan-on-trade/>

The White House. 2025. "Immediate Measures to Increase American Mineral Production." March 20, 2025. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/03/immediate-measures-to-increase-american-mineral-production/>

The White House. *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*. Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2017.

United States Census Bureau, *Foreign Trade Balance with China*, (n.d.). <https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html>

U.S. Department of State. "Minerals Security Partnership." <https://2021-2025.state.gov/minerals-security-partnership/#:~:text=Establishing%20the%20MS%20P,-MSP%20Launch%20%E2%80%93%20Canada&text=In%20June%202022%2C%20the%20Minerals, mining%20event%20in%20the%20world>

York, Erica. 2025. "Trump Tariffs: The Economic Impact of the Trump Trade War." Tax Foundation. March 18, 2025. <https://taxfoundation.org/research/all/federal/trump-tariffs-trade-war/>



DİPLOMATİK İLİŞKİLER ve POLİTİK ARAŞTIRMALAR MERKEZİ  
CENTER for DIPLOMATIC AFFAIRS and POLITICAL STUDIES

+90 216 310 30 40 info@dipam.org

+90 216 310 30 50 www.dipam.org

Merdivenköy Mah. Nur Sok. Business İstanbul  
A Blok Kat:12 No:115, Kadıköy/İstanbul

### ABOUT THE AUTHOR

**Meleknur Güler** graduated from Ege University, Department of International Relations in 2024 with a second degree. During her undergraduate studies, she participated in Erasmus exchange programs at the National University of Public Service in Hungary and Universitatea Babeş-Bolyai in Romania. She started her master's degree at Ege University in September 2024.

Güler has previously worked as an intern and volunteer in various national and international organizations and is currently continuing her internship at DİPAM focusing on the United States and China. Güler's research interests include the United States, the European Union, and international security issues.